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IHTRQPMCTIQN 
The Persian Gulf, a semi-enclosed sea, is an arm 
of the Indian Ocean lying between the Arabian Peninsula 
and Iran. The Gulf has figured prominently in the 
history since time immemorial, many civilizations 
flourished along its shores. The Gulf has become the 
focus of attention of the entire world mainly, on 
account of its bearing huge hydro-Carbon reserves. 
Beside the possession of huge wealth of natural 
resources, it is important from the strategic point of 
view. It has geo-political and geo-strategic 
significance. The Persian Gulf has a total area of 
97,000 squire miles having an extension of the Arabian 
Sea with which it is joined by a narrow strip of water 
measuring 25 miles. The Persian Gulf which is 
considered as international water-way stretches from 
the Shatt-al-Arab in the north west to the strail of 
Hormuz in the South East covering a distance of about 
600 miles. Roughly on an average, it is 200 miles wide 
having a depth of 228 feet . Generally speaking it 
1. Asopa, S.K..Oil Arms & Islam inthe Gulf. Printwell 
Publisher, Jaipur, 1986, p.4 
appears to be unsafe for super tankers and large naval 
vessels. The Persian Gulf embraces eight countries 
which share the waters of the Gulf. These countries 
which fall under the Persian Gulf are named as Iran, 
Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Bahrain, the U.A.E. 
and Oman. Among these countries, Iran enjoys a 
significant position for the fact that it has longest 
coast line. It appears that of the eight littoral 
states of the Persian Gulf, two states border directly 
on the strait of Hormuz, while six others are located 
2 
variously to it . Moreover, geographically Iran 
dominates entire northern flank of the Gulf. The 
northern point of the Gulf is only 800 miles from the 
southern border of the Soviet Union, Among the 
countries of the Persian Gulf, Iran happens to be the 
largest followed by Saudi Arabia, Iraq,the U.A.E., 
Bahrain, Qatar and Kuwait. Barring Iran and Iraq the 
other countries of the Gulf have small population and 
comparatively not very rich in natural resources. Iran 
is the largest populated country, possessing huge 
2. Ramzani, R.K., The Persian Gulf and the Strait of 
Harmuz. Syth off & Noordhoff, 1979, p.5. 
wealth of human natural resources. The total population 
of the Gulf is estimated at 74342271 which is sharply 
divided on an ethnic basis between the Iranians and the 
Arabs. There also lies animosity between the Persians 
and the Arabs because of the Battle of Qadisiva . which 
was fought in 768 A.D.. In this Battle Zoroastrean 
Persians were defeated by small Arab Army. Since then 
there has been an element of disliking for each-other, 
throughout their history, the two Nations have tried to 
control the other. 
During the 19th century, an era of massive 
intrusion in the political and economic affairs of the 
Middle East by the Western powers was started. In 
recent times the exigencies of the cold-war and the 
resulant great-power rivalries in the region and the 
dependence of the West on the Middle Eastern oil 
attracted the world attention. 
However, the Gulf has always been turbulent, 
backward and unstable. This instability is a sort of 
3. Refered to a holy war which was fought in 637 AD at 
Qadisiya: In this War Ibne-Abi-Raqqa led the Arab 
Army and defeated the Persians. 
threat to the western interest in the region . The 
geographical location of Iran is such that;,p it has 
always been a bridge between East and West, between 
Asia and Europe, and for that matter between Asia and 
Africa; and the Gulf. There has been a conflict on this 
region between great powers. Before 1971 Great Britain 
was playing an important role in this region. It had 
maintained the peace and security of the Gulf region 
for about 150 years. This was in response to a General 
Treaty which was signed by the East India Company in 
1920 with the local Sheikhs. This Treaty was signed for 
the achievement of the important objective to suppress 
the sea and land piracy. 
Britain assumed the role of protecting these 
countries of the Gulf from internal disorders and 
external threats. However, when the discovery of oil 
was made in this part of the world, it became more 
important for Britain and it tried to maintain a 
strong presence there. When the Soviet Union occupied 
4. J.B., Kelly, Arabian, the GUlf and the West. 
(London Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1980) p.p. vii-
vi ii. 
Northern Iran after the world war II, it created a 
sense of fear of Soviet expansion towards the South. 
Churchill and Truman saw this as an attempt by the USSR 
to gain access to the oil fields of the Gulf. But after 
the end of the world war II United kingdom found itself 
unable to retain its colonies. It began to grant 
independence to different countries. This situation led 
to the emergence of border disputes, ethnic rivalries, 
regional hegemonistic aspirations. Socialist inroads 
and out side powers turned the tranquil waters of the 
Gulf into a cauldron. Inside Iran also there were 
disturbances. Prime Minister Mosaddiq had already 
nationalized the oil industry in Iran and the Shah had 
to leave the country. 
However, the CIA became active in Iran and 
manipulated the affairs in such a way that it succeeded 
in the recall of the Shah and making him the police man 
of the Gulf. This reveals the pact that the USA held 
the most vital interest in this waters. 
In 1968, the leftist Ba'ath Party emerged in Iraq 
in a strong way and soon concluded an agreement of 
Friendship which was signed in same year between Iraq 
and the Soviet Union in 1972. This also reveals that 
the Soviet Union has its interests in the Gulf. In 
December 1979 Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan which 
clearly shows that Soviet Union is not only interested 
in this region, but has tried to keep the other super 
powers away from their southern borders. The internal 
conditions in the Gulf countries have not been 
conducive to longterm stability. Politically Gulf 
states are sharply divided. While Saudi Arabia is taken 
as pro-west and aligned very closely to the United 
States. On the contrary Iraq, following the 1958 
Revolution has been pro-Soviet with which it signed a 
Treaty of Friendship. Though generally political 
boundaries were settled by the time British left this 
area in 1971, but some disputes still linger on. These 
could become a Source of tension at some later date. 
It is generally blieved that the social structure 
of most of the Gulf countries is tribal and the people 
are conservative. The literacy rate is appreciately 
increasing but still a vast majority of people are 
generally uneducated. Despite family ties among the 
ruling class providing sense of stability, the 
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political system is vulnerable and the political 
structure is fragile. Earlier the population consisted 
of mainly nomads but now more and more people are 
moving to cities. There has been rapid development in 
the construction industry. Many high rise buildings 
have came up equipped with modern facilities. A rapid 
transformation in Society is taking place. The Society 
is gradually under going a change. More and more people 
are coming back from foreign countries after receiving 
higher education. This would lead to an increasing 
demand for democratic political regime, and ultimately 
there would emerge a clash between materialism and 
religious dogma. Earlier activities in the Gulf were 
confined to piracy, pearl diving and pilgrimage also 
cattle raising. Moreover, the sources of the revenue of 
the desert kingdom were also very limited. Countries 
like Iran, Iraq which were quite large but did possess 
much natural, resources, even if they had, they did not 
have the necessary technical ability to utilise the 
available resources for their benefit. The significance 
of the area to the outside world was more strategic 
than economic. It was only in the begining of the 20th 
9 
century that the black gold or oil was discovered in 
the Persian Gulf followed by the discovery of more and 
more oil wealth. Because of rapid discovery of more and 
more oil fields, most of the countries in the Persian 
Gulf were in possession of oil, the quantity of which 
varied from country to country. 
However, efforts were made to find more and more 
quantities of oil,Now it is confirmed that the Gulf 
holds two-third of the world's proven oil reserves. The 
progress in the field of industry in the advanced 
countries, resulted into massive increase in the demand 
for oil. Ultimately the area became important for the 
industrially advanced countries. The situation is such 
that the stoppage of this flow of oil from the Gulf 
countries would lead to massive losses in the 
industrially advanced countries. The absense of 
adequate supply of oil from the Gulf countries, would 
lead to a grinding halt of industries in the advance 
countries. A fall in the output of oil from the Gulf 
countries would result into considerable increase in 
the prices of oil. In 1987 total production of oil of 
the OPEC was 30 billion barrels perday and out of it 
10 
the Gulf countries were producing 18.3 billion barrels 
of oil perday. In 1974 the oil revenues increased to 
$110 billion Saudi Arabia at that time bearing only 9 
million people, earned $37 billion annually. 
Identity of interest whether, political, economic, 
military or cultural led to the emergence of many 
international groupings like Arab league, the Warsaw 
Pact, the Europeon Economic Community, the Islamic 
Conference Organization etc. Similarly there was always 
an urge for close co-operation and co-ordination among 
the Arab countries. However, despite many attempts no 
meaningful co-operation and co-ordination could come 
about, especially among the six Gulf Arab States. The 
co-operation and co-ordination was so slight as to be 
of little effect. Under previous British political and 
military suzerainty, the Sheikhdomes of the Gulf had 
separate and largely independent ways. Measures adopted 
between them far co-operation were of no consequence. 
Saudi Arabia was outside the British orbit. It followed 
its own independent policies as it was fully 
independent State. Gulf countries had, technically 
II 
at!east, the responsibility for their own internal 
affairs. 
Besides this there was neither political nor 
popular enthusiasm for moves towards closer ties with 
the outside powers of the people of the region. 
Moreover, since the Britain remained in effective 
control of all the larger and wider issues affecting 
the region, there was no need or incentive for 
individual states to take any initiative in the field 
of co-operation. 
However, during the sixties the course of events 
began to sharpen Gulf perceptions of the possible 
political future, unfolding before them. When Kuwait 
became independent in 1971, it became dearly evident 
that Britain would at last relinquish its over all 
authority in the rest of the area. Thereafter, Britain 
started giving mild encouragement to smaller Sheikhdoms 
of the Trucial States to under take some sort of 
greater co-peration and integration among themselves. 
The developments in the field of oil industry also led 
to an urge among the oil rich countries to get rid of 
subservience from the international oil companies and 
12 
they made efforts to obtain economic indepedence. This 
development offered them economic support for 
independent statehood. In the late sixties the British 
had started revealing their intention of withdrawing 
entirely from the Gulf and urged co-operation and co-
ordination. When it became clear that British did mean 
to go, the prospects tremendously increased and it 
forced them to think of practical aspects of life in an 
indpendent and unsupported state. It was in 1971 that 
an agreement was reached. Under this agreement Bahrain, 
Qatar and Seven Trucial Sheikhdoms of Abu Dhabi, Dubai, 
Sharjah, Ajman, Ras-al-Khaimah, Fujairah and Umm-al-
Quwain considered joining together in same kinds of 
federation or Union. In the same year Britain made an 
official announcement that it was withdrawing from it 
basis and colonies gast of Suez including the Arabian 
Gulf, the many Amirs and Sheikhs signed an agreement to 
make the United Arab Emirates (UAE). However, it took 
about three years for negotiation that UAE came into 
existance. Bahrain and Qatar both decided against 
joining the federation. They opted for independence on 
their own. By 1970s all countries of the region were in 
13 
a position to forge closer links in a common unity. 
There after at the initiative of Sultan Qaboos of Oman, 
the foreign ministers of Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Bahrain, 
Qatar, UAE, Saudi Arabia and Oman held a meeting in 
Muscat to discuss the Omani suggestion that a co-
ordinated regional security and defence policy be 
established. Since there were differences of opinion 
and ministers did not agree on a common position, the 
conference did not bring about positive results. This 
issue was not persued and no effective action was taken 
on Omani initiative. In 1976 attempts were made to 
arrive at an Arab regional consensus. The Amir of 
Kuwait Sheikh Jabir-al Ahmad-al-Sabah and the crown 
prince and Prime Minister Under took the visit of Gulf 
countries to discuss joint action to preserve the 
region's security and stability in the face of 
political, economic and security changes threatening 
this strategic area. An idea for the establishment of a 
Gulf Union as a vehicle for this joint action was 
mooted out by Sheikh Jabir. It was for the purpose of 
realising co-operation in all economic, political, 
educational and informational fields. 
14 
On the other hand, Kuwaiti were receiving $10 
billion every year from the sale of their oil. They 
have had the highest per capita income in the world 
after Brunei. We find that Iran's economy is also based 
on oil exports. It is therefore, assumed that none of 
the Gulf countries would like to see a permanent damage 
to its oil flow sale. The economies of oil exporting 
countries in the Persian Gulf are in a vulnerable 
position as they are totally depending on oil. If the 
export of oil is stopped, the economies of these 
countries would collapse. Most of the countries in the 
Persian Gulf therefore, have already started drawing 
plans to reduce dependence on oil. Income on account of 
the vulnerability of this international water way the 
countries in the Gulf engaged themselves in laying down 
new piplines to outlets outside the Gulf. It appears 
that the Gulf countries are still not in a position to 
fully utilise their wealth for the development of their 
countries. Major problems with which they are 
confronted, are the lack of technical manpower, 
insufficient infrastructure and economies of scale. 
15 
Military Strength: 
In the entire Gulf, Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Iran 
appear to have appreciably strong armed forces. 
However, the other smaller states of the Gulf like 
Qatar, Kuwait and Bahrain have comparatively lesser 
military capabilities. Among these countries Saudi 
Arabia is in possession of sophisticated military 
hardware but insufficient military trained personnel. 
During the sixtees and seventies Mohammad Reza Shah 
Pahlave had built up very large and well equipped armed 
forces. During his time,petro-dollars were spent to buy 
the latest weapons in the world's armouries. Besides 
this the Iranians gradually received military training 
from abroad . 
Internal Vulnerabilities: 
When small desert kingdoms opened their doors to 
the outside influences it rsulted into a danger of an 
upheaval in their social-political system. When 
education increased and larger number of people went 
5. For detail see, Singh, K.R., The Persian Gulf.Arms 
& Arms Control. Heritage Publisher, N. Delhi,1983, 
p.p. 22-24. 
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abroad tc receive education technical training from 
abroad the returned to their home lands and added a 
new strength to the growing middle class looking for 
political institutions. They wish that they should have 
voice in the decision making. The presence of large 
expatriate population has begun to make its presence 
felt. This sense is growing and at any moment it can 
explode and became instrumental in bringing about a 
change in the social set up of these countries. Besides 
this the differences between Sunni and Shi a also add to 
internal problems of these states. 
Inter-Arab Conflict: 
The boundries of the Gulf countries are also not 
very well settled. For example Iraq and Kuwait have 
differences. Bahrain and Kuwait both claim the 
possession of some adjacent islands. Another thorny 
issue which is a major threat is the aspirations of 
Iraqi Ba'athist regime to become the dominant power in 
the Gulf. Since Iraq has been secular, Socialist and 
pro-Soviet, the rest of the Arab States in the Gulf 
were quite concerned over the growing military strength 
of Iraq. 
17 
Arab-Israeli Issue: 
Despite the fact that Israelies are quite away 
from the Gulf but it has had an important bearing in 
the political affairs of Arab States. Israel has always 
made efforts to keep Arab States away from coming 
closer. It has not abstained from inflicting damages. 
Israel has done many blatant violations of 
international Law suppressed internationally recognized 
'Human Rights'. In 1981 Israel attacked Osirak nuclear 
plant of Iraq which was a blatant violation of 
International Law. 
Arab-Iranian Hostility: 
We trace the history of hostility between Arabs 
and Iranian to the oldin times. Besides a sense of 
cultural, superiority, Iranians have deeprooted hatred 
towards the Arabs. Both of them are Muslims but 
ethnically they are two different people. Despite 
efforts there has been no solution of these 
differences. The relations between Iranians and Arabs 
further deteriorated on account of Mohammad Reza Shah 
Pahlavi's military build-up, his acquisition of the 
18 
latest weapons, occupation of islands in the Gulf by 
force, changing the status-quo in the Shatt-al-Arab, 
supporting the Kurdish rebels inside Iraq, and 
hobnobbing with Israel. It is hoped that this long 
standing distrust between these two countries of the 
Muslim world will be removed peacefully and durable 
relations would be established. 
U.S.A. and the Gulf: 
USA's interest in the Gulf countries goes back to 
the 1820s when a US merchant arrived in Muscat. He was 
looking for trade opportunities. In response to this a 
Treaty of friendship and economic relations was signed 
between US and Muscat. In the begining United States 
was interested in taking away slaves from Oman. 
Thereafter, a wave of missionaries was set in towards 
the Gulf. The purpose of these missionaries was to 
spread Christianity. It rsulted in to increasing 
influence of the west in these tented desert villages . 
Many christian missions were opened especially in 
Basra, Kuwait, Bahrain and Muscat. On account of these 
missions American influence also increased in the 
Mulsim world. However, the British interests in the 
19 
Gulf were not challenged by the USA before the 
discovery of oil in 1904. Since 1904 the US influence 
in South West Asia started increasing. By 1949 a US 
naval force was kept around the Gulf region as a part 
of Middle East force. When the British withdrew from 
the Gulf, the US realised the fact that the vacuum 
which was created^should be filled-up. There was an 
apprehension that the others would enter the field. At 
that time the Senate majority leader Mike mansfield had 
doubts about the US fulfilling this role. Niether US 
had the men nor the reserves for it. The importance of 
this international waterway was so great to the USA 
that after 19 years US had 40 naval vessels and over 
25000 personnel. The purpose of this was not only to 
protect its own interest but also the interest of other 
states in the Gulf. Looking into the policy of US in 
the Gulf the following four elements are very 
important : 
1. To ensure the flow of oil. 
2. Encourage investments in the USA of Petro-
6. Mushahid Hussain, Frontier Post'. Peshawar, 13 
december, 1987. 
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dollars. Iran alone ordered $ 19.5 billion 
worth of arms between 1972 and 1978 from the 
USA. 
3. To obtain projects in Gulf States. 
4. Support friendly countries. 
When war started in 1971 between India and 
Pakistan the USA did not come up to the expectations 
of Pakistan. This thing raised doubts in the minds of 
other regional states about the total dependence on an 
outside power for their own security. Later on 
President Nixon, on the advice of his secretary of 
state. Henry Kissinger, decided to increase the 
military capability of those countries in South West 
Asia, which had the ability and political will to check 
Soviet expansionist designs. This policy was named as 
Nixon Doctrine out of this policy Iran benefitted a 
lot and Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi became the policeman 
of the Gulf. He had acquired sophisticated weapons from 
the US arms merchants. This policy did not succeed more 
than a decade or so. He was dependent on the wishes of 
one men. When Shah left the scene US became a "Great 
Satan" in the eyes of Ayatollah Khomeini. And it 
2i 
resulted into an on-coming revolution, to irradicate 
rampant corruption, repressive policies, lack of 
democracy, uneven economic development and unjust 
distribution of wealth led to mass-uprising against the 
Shah. Every policy of Shah was critisized. Ayatullah 
Khomeini with his religious zeal and his determination 
to export Islam outside Iran brought about a change in 
strategic environment completely to the disadvantage of 
Washington. 
The Carter Doctrine was aimed at preventing the 
control of the Gulf falling into the hands of Soviets 
or countries unfriendly to the USA. Moreover it was the 
military responsibility of President Carter to protect 
the US vital, stakes in the area. 
For centuries Soviet Union has had 
interest in moving Southwards. There was much talk 
about the (warm waters) theory which was propounded by 
every leader of the So-called free world. Every book on 
geo-strategy leading with super power rivalry in Asia 
contained this theory. However, now the things have 
22 
changed. Development in nuclear and other weapons have 
enabled Moscow and Washington to have easy access to 
any part of the globe. Soviet Union acquired basis and 
other facilities in friendly countries and it enabled 
the Soviet Union to maintain a large naval presence in 
and around the flesh point of the world. But now in 
view of these developments, there seems to be little 
need to have some such basis. In the ninetienth century 
Czarist Russia moved South and over run the Muslim 
Khanates of central Asia. After the second world war, 
Soviet Union occupied Azeri portions of Norther Iran. 
It was under pressure that it had to give it up. The 
Soviet Union also made incursions in Muslim countries 
of the Middle East and in the horn of Africa. It also 
moved in to Afghanistan. But this can be said 
convenienthy that it was not the prime objective of 
Soviet Union to occupy neighbouring countries. 
Countries which remain under the influence of Soviet-
Union or are sensitive to soviet needs, they are 
assured of help. Soviet assistance does not confine to 
only moral and diplomatic support but also of 
preparedness to use military force. The geo-political 
23 
situation in the Gulf underwent some changes and it 
apprehended the Soviet Union of the fact that Iraq 
could gradually slip away from the Soviet influence . 
7. For detail See, Asopa's book entitled, Oi1, Arms and 
Islam in the Gulf, pp.11-118. 
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CHAPTER -I 
Geographical Location And Importance of the Gulf. 
Trade. Oil. Strategy & Defence 
The "Gulf" fed by the waters of the Tigris, 
Euphrates, Karkheh and Karun is a land locked sea 
extending in the south Easternly direction from the 
mouth of the Shattal-Arab in Iraq to the straits of 
Hormuz. It is covering an area of 97000 sq. miles. 
Below it in the South Eastern direction lies the Gulf 
of Oman stretching from the strait of Hormuz to Rasal 
Hada at the eastern tip of the Arabian Peninsula. From 
the mouth of the Shatt-al-Arab to the strait of Hormuz 
is some 500 miles. The breadth of the Gulf varies from 
180 miles at its widest to 25 miles at the strait of 
Hormuz. The two Gulf constitute a composite geo-
political unit with their history interwoven into a 
common pattern. The Gulf of Oman in turn opens into the 
Arabian Sea and thus links the Persian Gulf with the 
seas skirting on the western pertphery of the Indian 
subcontinent . 
1. John, M,, The Persian Gulf in the Twenteith 
Century. London, 1962, p.p.1-3. 
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The Gulf IS bounded on the east by the great 
plateau of Persia and on the west by the Plateau of 
Arabia, both of a considerable elevation and separated 
from the Gulf by low lying coastal plains. Persian Gulf 
also called as Arabian Gulf. In Arabic it is known as 
BAHR PARIS and in Persian it is KHALIJ-E-FARS. Persian 
Gulf is a marginal sea of the Indian Ocean covering an 
area of 29500 sq. miles between the Arabian Peninsula 
and south western Iran. The Gulf contains the island 
state of Bahrain which is bordered by Iran to the north 
and the east, the U.A.E., and Oman to the south, Saudi 
Arabia and Qatar to the west and Kuwait and Iraq to the 
2 
north west . 
This Gulf is traditionally known as the Persian 
Gulf. Most of the writers have used this term as 
Persian Gulf because today's Iran was popularly known 
as Persia before the centuries back and this Persia was 
named after the name of Persian Gulf as Persia (Iran) 
is having the longest coastal line of this Gulf. 
However the expression "Persian Gulf", has been 
popularly used by almost all writers on this area. 
2. The New Encylopeadia, Britanica.9, Other Rethiman 
on .p.309. 
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The landmasses surrounding the Gulf has often been 
termed as the Persian Gulf Region. Though, from a 
geographical point of view, the Persian Gulf Region 
should comprise the coastline of the Gulf and the 
island that lie within it. Thus when understood from a 
political point, of view it would constitute the 
islands within the Gulf and the countries that kiss its 
shores. 
The term the 'Gulf has come into use very 
recently. Prior to that this area was taken to mean 
different things to different people to denote a 
collection of people and often a political entity or a 
view point. This term was originally of European-
western orientation. It was after second world war when 
the Persian or the Arabian Gulf assumed added 
importance. Even now there is no universally accepted 
definition of the Gulf. However, until a few years ago, 
it was known in the west as the "Persian Gulf" mainly 
because of the emergence of Iran as the most dominant 
power. An English newspaper editor in Tehran who used 
the phrase "Arabian Gulf". However, there is a 
considerable majority of scholars and intellectuals of 
2a 
the present time in whose opinion the 'Gulf is taken 
to mean all the members of the Gulf cooperation Council 
and Iraq mainly because of common language, religion 
3 
and culture . 
The Persian Gulf has a long coastline and there 
are as many as eight countries which have their borders 
Co-terminous with its waters. Moving from strait of 
Hormuz in an anti clock wise direction, these countries 
are, Iran towards its east, Iraq on its north, Kuwait 
on its north west, the Al-Hassa provinece of Saudi 
Arabia towards its west followed by the Bahrain, the 
Peninsula of Qatar and the Federation of United Arab 
Emirates towards its south. While a small tip of Oman 
also borders the U.A.E. on the Persian Gulf, its 
mainland lies towards the Arabian sea. 
A - Political Importance: 
In the context of European diplomacy, the region 
became politically important only after the discovery 
of the route to India via the cope of good hope and the 
3. Jha.A.N., India's Economic Diplomacy in the Gulf. 
ABC Publishing, House, New Delhi, 1988,p.p. 20-21. 
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subsequent development of the Purtuguese, British, 
French and the Dutch interests in Asia. The Purtuguese 
Viceroy, Alfonso de Alubu-querque was the first 
European to set about the task of founding an Empire in 
the East. Alburquerque's attention was drawn towards 
the Persian Gulf for two reasons. He, in the first 
instance, believed that the dominance over the Gulf and 
the Red Sea was necessary for any maritime power with 
possessions in India. Besides a monopoly over the 
Indian trade he thoght, could be made possible only 
through acquiring control over the Arab route to East 
through Egypt and Mesopatamia. It was among other's 
mainly for these reasons only that the British, after 
consolidating their position in India turned to the 
Gulf region . Such an importance of the Gulf region was 
recognised even by the French Government, which under 
Napolean, sent emissaries to the Middle East to explore 
the possibility of an advance towards India. However, 
apart from this Napoleanic interlude which for a decade 
projected the Gulf into an arena of international 
4. ibid, p.7 
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politics. The region remained sheltered from rival 
European influences during most of the 19th century. In 
this period the British East India Company followed an 
active policy in the Gulf region and after establishing 
its commercial hegemony, gradually turned towards 
establishing its political supremacy here. This it did 
by negotiating treaties with Persia and the various 
5 
Arab states of the Gulf littorals . 
B - Importance-Trade: 
The geographical location of the Gulf region has 
from time immemorial, made it an area of great 
commercial activity and thereby of great economic 
importance. Ever since the dawn of history, the Gulf 
has been a channel of trade and communication between 
the ancient centres of civilization and the outer 
world. The Harappans of north India and later the 
ancient Mesopatamian states like Babylonia exploited 
the Gulf for trading between Arabia and India . In the 
centuries following Christ it was used in a similar 
5, ibid, p.24. 
6. Jha, A.N., op.cit., p.22. 
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manner by the Romans who because of their rivalry with 
Persia, preferred the Red Sea route to India. 
The advent of Islam ended the use of the Gulf 
region as a highway of international trade between 
India and Europe, but its significance as a Commercial 
Centre was restored by the transference of the 
epicentre of the Islamic Empire to Damascus and 
Baghdad. With the comming into prominence of Hormuz, 
the Gulf acquired a legendary fame as an international 
commercial centre . 
The Oil: 
The Gulf region however, has not lost the 
importance it enjoyed then, Its importance, on the 
other hand, has only increased due to the huge surplus 
deposits of oil and natural Gas. It had been estimated 
that this region alone had 56.358 of the world's total 
oil reserves at the end of 1974. By 1985 after the 
discovery of some new oil fields in Saudi Arabia and 
other parts of the Gulf, it has been estimated that the 
7. ibid,p.p. 22-23. Hormuz offered a more agreable 
scene than any city in the east, Persons from all 
parts of the globe exchanged their commodities, 
with an air of Politeness, the city was crowded 
beautiful women from all parts of the Asia. 
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Gulf contains about 58.7X of the proven oil reserves of 
the non-communist world. Petroleum statistics in 1974, 
show that the total oil output of 56.7 million dollar 
per barrel an average of 22.6 million dollar per barrel 
were supplied by the Gulf States. However, between 1979 
and 1982 the world Petroelum demand fell down from 52 
million dollar per barrel to 46 million dollar per 
barrel out of which the OPEC produced about 31 million 
dollar per barrel and by the end of 1982 it brought 
down its production ceiling to 18 million dollar per 
brrel®. 
Table - 1 
Proven Pablished Crude Oil And Qas Reserves 
fif ihfi Gulf Countries 
Name of the 
Country 
Saudi Arabia 
Iraq 
Kuwait 
U A E 
Bahrain 
Qatar 
Central Zone 
Oil Reserves 
(OOOmi11 ion 
barrels) as at 
1st January 1985 
169.00 
44.50 
90.00 
32.69 
00.17 
03.35 
05.45 
Production 
at 1984 
levels 
102 
100 
267 
143 
12 
24 
32 
Gas Reserves 
(10** cu.ft.) 
as at 1st 
January 1986. 
78, 000 
29, 000 
32, 000 
72, 400 
7, 103 
1,48, 000 
8, 210 
Source : Jha, A.N., India's Economic Diplomacy in the 
Gulf. ABC Pub. House, New Delhi, 1988, p.25. 
8. ibid, p.24. 
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Between 1979 and 1982 the demand for oil declined 
mainly because the economies of the industrialized 
world were in the grip of recession. The showing down 
of economic activity led to a fall in the demand for 
oil. Besides, this thing, the British and North Sea Oil 
companies had started destocking oil. This resulted 
into the emergence of oil glut in international market. 
Under these circumstances the demand for oil had 
declined. 
Oil Reserves Before Iran-Iraa War: 
Before commencing the I ran-Iraq war in September 
1980. The Gulf oil reserves by 1978 were estimated to 
over 332 billion barrels, around 40 percent of the 
world total proven reserves (Table 1.1) Saudi Arabia 
more than 165 billion barrels had the largest proven 
reserves, followed by Kuwait (66 billion barrels), Iran 
(59 billion barrels) and Iraq (32 billion barrels), the 
smallest proven reserves being in Sharjah (11 million 
barrels). With a production of around 14 million 
barrels a day. The Gulf oil reserves are expected to 
last almost until the end of the next century. 
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Table - 1.1 
Crude Oil Reserves In The Quif 
(million barrels) 
Country 
Saudi Arabia 
Iran 
Kuwait 
Iraq 
Qatar 
Dubai (UAE) 
Sharjah (UAE) 
Oman 
Bahrain 
Proven 
by the 
oi1 reserves 
end of 1978 
163, 
58, 
65, 
31, 
3, 
1, 
2, 
350 
000 
400 
000 
760 
400 
11 
400 
240 
Source : Sreedhar, The Gulf. Scramble for Security 
ABC Pub. House, New Delhi, 1983, p.p.2-3. 
The contribution of the Gulf states came down 
to about 9 to 5 million dollar per barrel as Saudi 
Arabia known as swing producer announced a separate cut 
of 7 million dollar per barrel in its production. The 
world's demand for the Gulf oil has steadily been on 
the increase till recently. Even now the United States 
dependence on the Gulf oil is about 15 percent, west 
Europe imports about 68 percent of its requirements 
from the Gulf, and Japan relies for almost 90 percent 
of oil imports from the region. Altogether the Gulf 
provides for about 60 to 65 percent of oil in the rest 
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Q 
of the world including communist nations . 
Much of the importance of the Gulf region is 
associated with oil. However, as the prices of oil is 
concerned the basic crude price which had almost 
remained static, and at times even decreased between 
1947 and 1970, were fixed at $ 2.59 per barrel by the 
1971 Tehran agreement between a group of international 
oil companies and the Organisation of Petroleum 
Exporting Countries . The price, however significantly 
increased by the Tehran Resolution of 1973 and put at $ 
11.65 per barrel, after talks to the above effect had 
earlier taken place between the OPEC countries and 
Kuwait and Tehran. Consequently by the end of the 
seventies, the Gulf alone have had an income from oil 
over 40 billion or five times of the 1970 figure. By 
1980 in the wake of the second oil crisis of 1979, the 
oil revenues of the Gulf countries shot up further as a 
result of another hike in crude price ranging $ 32 to $ 
38 a barrel . It was in the London meeting of March 
9. ibid, p.27. 
10. ibid, p.27. 
11. OPEC Review, Autumn, 1979, vol.Ill, No.3, 
Vienna,Austria p.p. 72-73. 
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1983 of OPEC countries which fixed the price at $29 per 
barrel in the light of the falling demand. These prices 
were however, maintained till October 1984. But since 
the beginning of 1985 till now a price war has been 
going on and the oil prices have come down to $11 a 
barrel. However, in all these countries. Petroleum 
accounts for the lion's share of foreign exchange 
revenues. Even in Iran, which is industrially the most 
advanced country of the region, about 80 percent of 
its total finance have been derived from oil revenues 
so far. For all other Gulf states, this ratio runs much 
12 
higher 
Regarding the 1979 oil crisis, the twin political 
events in the Gulf the Iranian revolution (1979) and 
the I ran-Iraq war (1980) reduced these two OPEC members 
to the level of small exporters on account of the 
declining production and increasing consumption at home 
owing to the war. This provided opportunity to Saudi 
Arabia to make up for the loss caused by freezing of 
the prices. The supply of the Saudi Oil on the spot 
12. Jha, A, N., op. cit., p.28. 
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market increased which affected the small producers 
adversely. Then the Saudi behaviour came under severe 
criticism from Libya, Iran and even Kuwait, were 
critical of Saudi over production and violation of OPEC 
decisions . 
However, the rise in prices of oil in 1979 were 
due to the same reasons that were true of the 1973-74 
oil price rise, for this there were several reasons. 
(a) It is about a third as large and in real terms 
it represents (at $30 per barrel) a rise of 
only some 60X on the 1973 level. 
(b) It is the second time around so that any 
nervousness in financial markets about the 
ability of the financial system to cope, will 
not be there this time. 
(c) The spending of OPEC Nations is now well into 
its stride, indeed they are complaining they 
need this money just to keep pace with the 
14. 
inflation and the commitments . 
13. Asopa, S. K., Oil. Arms and Islam in the Gulf. 
Printwell Publisher, Jaipur, 1986, p.p. 57-58. 
14. OPEC Review. Winter, 1979, vol.III-IV, Vienna, 
Austria, p. 149. 
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In terms of defence there are only three major 
Gulf states which have reasonably strong armed forces 
i.e. Saudi Arabia, Iran and Iraq. Iran was the 
strongest in her armed forces before the Iran-Iraq war. 
But due to this prolonged war, her defence has been 
weakened. At the present juncture of Iraq's invasion of 
Kuwait on 2nd August, 1990 and the annextion of the 
city state a week later, Iraq claims to have fully 
recovered her original position of a strong military 
power in the region. The other smaller Gulf States, 
Qatar, Bahrain and Kuwait have comparatively lesser 
military capabilities. The strength of the armed forces 
of the Gulf countries is as follows, Iran 704,500, Iraq 
845,000, Saudi Arabia 67,500, U.A.E. 43,000, Oman 
21,500, Kuwait 12,000, Qatar 6,000,and Bahrain 2,800 . 
Besides, this strength of the Gulf,there is also a 
10,000 strong 'Paninsula Shield' based in Jeddah for 
the Gulf Co-operation Council. It is fact that the 
Saudi Arabia is having a sophisticated military 
15. The fmilitary Balance,International institute for 
strategic studies, London,1986-87. 
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hardware but has insufficient military trained 
manpower. Iraq's armed forces are well equipped with 
mainly Soviet Weapons. War losses were taking their 
toll which pleased Israel more than even Iran. Raza 
Shah had built up very large and well equipped armed 
forces, he spent petro-dollars to buy the latest 
weapons in the world's armouries. His officers and 
military man gradually received military trainng 
abroad. The Iranian Revolution eliminated the Shah's 
loyal officers right down to the major's level. 
Khomeini's Iran however, relied more on motivation than 
on modern weapons 
Qgif strateay: 
The Gulf has become the centre of interest of 
almost the entire world. To understand its strategic 
importance it is needed to analyse the geo-political 
and geo-strategic significance of an area. Some factors 
which determine the geo-strategic significance of this 
area are its geo-historical background. The Gulf 
possesses the area of 90,000 square miles which is 
16. Daily Muslim,Islamabad, 15 June,1987,p.7 
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joined with the Arabian Sea by a narrow water way of 25 
miles width. This water way is an international one, 
joining the Shatt-al-Arab in the north west and the 
strait of Hormuz in the south west with the total 
length of 600 miles. Its average width of 200 miles and 
depth of 300 feet can not provide safety for super 
tankers and big ships . 
The water of the Gulf is shared by eight ountries, 
Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Bahrain, the 
U.A.E. and Oman, the longest coastline in the north 
belongs to Iran while Iraq has only a short coastline 
of 10 miles. Saudi Arabia also possesses a short coast 
line but it has another outlet to the Red Sea at the 
east. Other countries lie along the south of the Gulf 
with Oman at the narrowest point. The big vessels from 
the Ocean can enter the Shatt-al-Arab for the distance 
of 120 miles upto Basra Port of Iraq. 
The distance between the northern most point of 
the Gulf to the nearest border of the USSR, from the 
narrowest point in the south to the airbuses in 
17. 'Strategic Studies', security in the Gulf, Regional 
and Global Aspects, Winter, Vol. XI, No.2, 1987, 
Islamabad,p.12. 
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THE GULF COUNTRIES 
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Afghanistan, and from the Strait of Hormuz to the 
western tip of Pakistan are 800, 500 and 300 miles 
respectively. Most of the inter!and is desert equipped 
with limited infrastructure, with also a long mountain 
range stretching from Turkey to Afghanistan barring the 
land communication from north to south. 
The sizes of the countries in the Gulf from the 
largest to the smallest are respectively Iran, Saudi 
Arabia, Iraq, the UAE and Bahrain, Qatar and Kuwait. 
Iran and Iraq are the most crowded countries while the 
others are sparsely populated due to the lack of 
necessary natural resources. The total population of 
the entire Gulf is sixty(60) millions. The population 
divided by race basis into the Arabs and the Persians. 
Whose animosity can be traced back far in the past. 
Iran is the only country occupied by the Persian 
stocks, though there are a number of Persians 
scattering in other countries as well. In Khuzistan at 
the south of Iran there are large number of Arabs. 
Though the whole Gulf has a common language, 
religion,the complication still takes place by the 
division of the same faith into different sects-
44 
Sunni,Shia, Wahabi & Druze and other. The majority of 
Iran is Shia, while nearly equal numbers of Sunni and 
Shi as live in Iraq, Dubai and Bahrain. Saudi Arabia has 
Wahabi majority. The matter becomes more difficult 
because the three Shia states (Iraq, Dubai, and 
18 
Bahrain) are ruled by Sunni rulers . 
Internal troubles and external influences of the 
countries in the Gulf area brought the opportunistic 
British to this region, claiming to be their 
protectors. In the present century when the oil was 
discovered in the area, the British naturally tried to 
maintain its strong hold. The British Prime Minister 
Churchill and Truman President of USA were concerned by 
the USSR's occupation of the northern part of Iran 
after the World War II in the east that the Soviet 
influence might stretch southwards. Anyhow, after the 
18. Strategic Studies, Winter,Vol. XI, No.2,1987, 
Islamabad, pp. 12-13. 
Gulf Countries Area and Population: Iran (Area-
1648000 sq. km., Population-49,857,384) Iraq (Area-
438317 sq.km., Population-16110,000) Saudi Arabia 
(Area-2240,000 sq.km., Population-14020,000), UAE 
(Area-77,700,sq.km. Population-1,622,464), Bahrain 
(Area-691.2 sq.km. Population-350,798). Qatar 
(Area-11,437 sq.km. Population-369,079) Kuwait 
(Area-17818 sq. km. Population-1872,569). 
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World War II Britain was bound to release hercolonies, 
including the Gulf countries, from her possession. Once 
becoming independent,the countries could not maintain 
their peace due to several causes like rivalries 
between races, disputes concerning borders, outside 
19 
interferences and others . The U.S. began to glance at 
the Gulf countries with the smearing of her lips. At 
the same time saw also the attempts of the USSR to keep 
away the other Superpower USA from the area and assert, 
if possible, her own power instead. The emergence of 
Islamic Republic of Iran in 1979, and the outbreak of 
war between the two neighbours, Iraq and Iran, help to 
increase the turmoil of the Gulf. Politically the Gulf 
states are not in conformity with each other due to 
their different policies, approaches and actions. 
After 1904 it came to be known that every country 
of the Gulf possessed oil. At the present the Gulf area 
can produce oil as much as two-third of the total 
quantity produced around the world. It is therefore 
natural that this area acquired of great strategic 
19. Bhutani., S., Contemporary Gulf, Academic Press, 
New Delhi, 1980, p.p.120-121. 
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importance, those countries become wealthy because of 
their oil exports. Ways are searched to reduce the 
countries less dependent only on the international 
waterway. Pipe lines are laid from Iran beyond the 
Strait of Hormuz and from Iraq to the Mediterranean 
20 
through Turkey and to Yanbu on the Red Sea . Anyhow, 
the long war between Iran and Iraq has made a major 
setback. Those who are not presently involved in the 
war, like Saudi Arabia, are trying to build up their 
military strength by accumulating all sorts of 
expensive hardware. The three major states, Saudi 
Arabia, Iran and Iraq have considerable military 
strength while the smaller states have not yet been 
21 
able to appreciate their defence capabilities . 
Conflicts in the Gulf are many. At the present 
there are inter Arab conflict, Arab-Iranian conflict 
and Arab-Israeli conflict. Disputes concerning boundary 
and territorry frequently take place among the 
neighbouring Arab states. For instance there are 
20. Agwani, M.S., Politics in the Gulf. Vikas Pub,, New 
Delhi, 1978, p.p.11-12. 
21. Asopa, S.K., op. cit., p.p.9-10. 
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differences between Iraq and Kuwait. The world has 
watched and have strongly reacted, especially the 
west, that Iraq suddenly broke away the on going 
negotiation with Kuwait in a bid to resolve its 
disputes and invaded Kuwait on the 2nd August, 1990.A 
week later, Iraq startled the international community 
by announcing Kuwait's annexation and recently {28th 
August, 1990) by merging Kuwait as its 19th district 
and thus, made a bid to put in end to Kuwaiti national 
identity. A Bahrain and Kuwait, Oman and Saudi Arabia 
and Iraq and Iran. The Iranian Revolution 1979 
performed largely by the Shi a clergymen also creats 
fear to the non-Shi a states, the creation of Israel by 
the big powers specially the US led to the bitter 
menace between the Arab states and the Jewish one. 
Political events taking place in the neighbouring 
countries can also be threatening to the Gulf. The 
Soviet invasion of Afghanisatn is one of those events. 
The troops of the USSR which moved forward beyond the 
Oxcus had created fear among many countries that the 
Soviet troops might come southward or might interfere 
with the free flow of oil through the Strait of HornMJZ. 
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Now the troops were expected to withdraw from 
22 
Afghanistan without any proceeding in that direction 
The USSR is forced by some circumstances to make friend 
with the Muslim world. However, the threat to the Gulf 
countries is more feasible from some neighbouring 
countries due to the lack of proper arm forces. 
Pakistan has a long history of contact with the 
Gulf. In the present it also has friendly relationship 
with the Gulf countries. Khomeini's Iran is in good 
term with Pakistan and the latter shows neutrality 
towards the issue of conflict between Iraq and Iran. 
She also supports the view that the security of the 
Gulf is the responsibility of the Gulf states 
themselves. There are questions from the Gulf states 
concerning the Pakistan connections with the US 
security plans, but the matter is refuted by the 
Pakistani government. 
In the present there is a political equilibrium in 
the Gulf. Iran checks the attempt of Iraq to dominate 
the Gulf. The statement has came true in the wake of 
22. Yodfat, A.Y., The Soviet Union and Revolutionary 
Iran, Croom Helm, London, 1984,p.68. 
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Iraq's invasion and annexation on 2nd August, 1990 and 
9th August, 1990 respective!. Inter Arab rivalry has to 
reduce infront of the common threat from Iran. The 
USSR's attempts to increase her influence in the area 
are done by the diplomatic and economic ways instead of 
by military forces. The US on the otehr hand, wants to 
penalise Iran for her anti American actions, much 
capturing US citizens as hostages in early stages of 
the Islamic revolution by freezing Iran's assets, the 
US is further keen to prevent the expansion of the 
USSR's power in the Gulf. Thus the Gulf has became a 
stage for international rivalries and competition for 
maximum gains in this area. 
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CHAPTER - II 
Historical Background of the Gulf: Alien Occupation 
Release and Independence: 
The Gulf has acquired tremendous importance in the 
contemporary international politics mainly because of 
its unique geo-strategic location and huge oil wealth, 
situated at the cross-roads as a bridge between Asia, 
Africa and Europe. This part of the Asian Continent has 
been defined by scholars and statesmen differently. The 
term "Gulf" has come into use very recently. Prior to 
that this area was taken to mean different things to 
different people,to denote a collection of people and 
often a political entity of a view point. This term was 
originally of Europeon connotation. The 19th century 
"Near East" or "Far East" were useful in the French and 
English rivalry for trade and military dominance from 
Mediterranean sea to the Indian Ocean . 
Dwelling upon the nomenclature of the region of 
present South West Asia we came across different terms 
and its said "The term 'Middle East' was coined in 1902 
by the American noval historian, A.T. Mahan in a 
1. Jha, A.N., India's Economic Dfeolomacv in the Gulf. 
ABC Publishing House, New Delhi, 1988, p.20. 
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discussion of British naval strategy in relation to 
Russian activity in Iran and a German project for a 
Berlin to Baghdad Railway" At that time prevalent terms 
were "Near East" and "Far East". Since Mahan was to 
refer to a region centred on the Persian Gulf in 
connection with a German project for a Berlin to 
Baghdad Railway, he therefore, found these terms 
2 
inadequate and used the term *Middle East' . 
It was after the second world war when the Gulf 
assumed added importance, even now there is no common 
and universally accepted definition of the term called 
'Gulf. A sailor would use it for a land locked Sea, 
which, stretches from the strait of Hormuz upto the 
mouth of the Shatt-al-Arab, an Iranian might think of 
the area from Abadan down to Bandar Abbas, to the Ras-
al-Khaimah. It was known in the west as the "Persian 
Gulf" mainly because of the emergence of Iran as the 
most dominant power both economically and militarily of 
the region. 
2. Peter Beaumount, Blake and Wagstaff, The Middle 
East. A Geographical Study, John wiley & Sons, 
London, 1976, p.1. 
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However, for all practical purposes, the Gulf is 
made up of Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman and United Arab 
Emirates, Saudi Arabia is a part of the Gulf but is too 
big important, too individual to be jumped in with its 
neighbours. Much the same applies to Iran, and the fact 
that the Iranians are not Arabs. However, there is a 
considerable majority of scholars and intellectuals in 
whose opinion, the "Gulf" is taken to mean all the 
members of the Gulf Cooperation Council and Iraq mainly 
because of their common language, religion, culture and 
3 
tradition, and security perceptions . However, every 
one of these states has its own character,largely 
beacuse of the way that each has developed in its own 
way and determine their priorities. They have been 
independent countries down the ages, partly by 
geographical reasons, partly by the accidents of the 
history. Since they are now independent, they can 
afford to minimise the effects of the outside 
influence. During the I ran-Iraq War, most important 
thing which brought them toghether was the mutual fear. 
They had the fear that after the end of the 8 years 
3. Jha, A.N. Op.cit., p.21. 
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long war,both victorious, Iran and Iraq would, turn its 
attention towards the other Gulf countries, make their 
presence felt and gradually through agreements seek all 
kinds of favour from them to improve the socio-economic 
damages and restore to improve economic institution and 
give their industrial activity that had almost come in 
both countries to stand still. 
Normalization of relations in both the warring 
nations, first and most urgent need was to restore 
confidence among their respective peoples, arrange 
large stock of food and other common articles, 
restoration of work at schools and colleges, mills, 
factories and farms to indicate the scarcities during 
the war are now being made up with tremendous effect. 
In the case of Iraq, president Saddam Hussein and 
his country placed all of power to knock out tiny 
Kuwait, and this has happened on 2nd August, 1990. 
Violatarily with any immmediate provocation or 
grievance. The world wide condemnations and appeals 
from his well wishers to evacuate Kuwait which 
fulfledged soveriegn, indepedent nation recognized by 
the U.N. and all international organizations. The west 
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reacted spontaneously by unmassing its haviest military 
and air force. 
The history of the Gulf is very old, however, I am 
taking this history after 15th century. There was 
colonial rivalry between the Portugese and the British 
which reached the Gulf in early 16th century. The 
Portugese were the first to colonize it. They captured 
Bahrain in 1507 and Hormuz in 1514 and thus deprived 
the British of this trade route from Europe to Asia. 
Persians captured these ports in 1622 and ejected the 
Portugese. The Persians in turn were expelled by Arab-
Khalifa family in 1783. British entered the Gulf in the 
middle of the 18th century but all through this period 
they had to fight against the French, Dutch and others 
for power in the Gulf. In consolidating their hold over 
the Gulf region the British entered a number of 
treaties with the local Amirs and Sheikhs which gave 
them enormous powers. Later on the naval paramountacy 
of the British in the Gulf came into conflict with the 
Russian desire to expand in this direction. German 
succeeded in securing a contract from the Ottoman 
Empire to construct the constantinopole, Baghdad 
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Railway line in 1899 to be extended later upto Kuwait . 
The increasing German interest in the region 
brought Britain and Russia closer to each other 
resulted in the Anglo-Russian convention of 1907 
(According to this convention, Britain undertook to 
accomodate Russian interests in the region and 
adjoining areas). Britain also concluded an agreement 
with Kuwait in 1891 with which no other foreign power 
can enter in the region without the permission of the 
Britain. British consolidated its position in the Gulf 
through treaties with Oman, Muscat, Qatar, Bahrain, 
Kuwait and the U.A.E.. 
Britain also had its oil interests and had 
acquired oil concessions in Iran in 1901 and 
established the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company in 1909. A 
similar concession was acquired in Iraq through the 
4. Asopa, S.K., Oil. Arms and Islam in the Gulf. 
Printwell Publisher, Jaipur, 1986, p.5. 
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Turkish Petroleum Company. But according to the Red 
line Agreement of 1928 Britain had to share these oil 
concessions with the United Satates . Iraqi Oil Company 
came under the control of the Turks. Petroleum Company, 
a multi national oil company in which Britain, United 
States, France and the Dutch participated. American 
group operated in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia. Kuwait's 
oil was handled by a joint Anglo-American group. In 
Qatar and other Gulf Sheikhdoms multi national Iraqi 
Petroleum Comapny's subsidiary agencies operated. 
Gulf Between The Two World Wars : 
The Germany in alliance with the Ottoman Turkey 
during the first world war planned to dislodge the 
British power in the Gulf. But the defeat of Germany 
and dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire frustrated 
_ ^ — _ _ 1 I 
Red Line Agreement: In 1925 after long negotiations 
(finalised in 1928 US and Britain) US companies 
(Standard oil of New Jersy and, Socony Vacuum) were 
admitted in the Turkish Petroleum Company (TPC), the 
concessionaire in Iraq. The Anglo-Persian Oil Company 
also relinquished half of its holdings to American 
group, thus giving the later a 23.75515 share. In return 
theUS agreed not to seek separate oil concessions in 
territories of the defunct Ottoman Empire. This 
agreement is known as the Red Line Agreement of 1928. 
5. Amir Sadeghi, H.,(ed.), The security ofthe Persian 
Gulf. Croom Helm, London, 1981, p.3. 
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these plans. However,at the end of the war Britain 
emerged stronger than ever before and was the sole 
claiment of power in the Gulf. With the establishment 
of the League of Nations in 1920 the territories of the 
fallen empires came to be placed under the control of 
Mandate Commission which assigned them to Britain and 
France. 
The destruction of German and the Russian threat 
provided Britain with sufficient scope to consolidate 
its power in the region, but Iran under Shah Reza Khan 
posed problems for Britain. Reza Khan being a despotic 
monarch cherished a big role for Iran. His plan was to 
bring Iran under a centralized authority and to 
modernize the country. 
Russian threat: There are atleast three hypothetical 
circumstances under which the Soviet Union might 
threaten the Persian Gulf oil: first, in a situation of 
general war with the west; Second, as an out grow the 
conflict in the Gulf if the Soviet Union intervened to 
protect, help or hinder one or more local countries; 
third in a contingency where neither general war nor 
local war were under way but where the Soviet Union 
felt threatened elsewhere and was prepared to disrupt 
the economic power of the western world, to redress 
what it felt were unacceptable threats to its security, 
for example a major crisis between Soviet-Union and 
china or a crisis in Eastern Europe, (see for detail) 
Amir Sadeghi, H.,(ed)=.), The Security of the Persian 
Gulf. Croom Helm, London, 1981, p.28. 
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With the outbreak of second world war in 1939 the 
Gulf owing to its geo-political and strategic 
importance became vulnerable to Nazi and Fascist 
expansionists designs. The mounting pressure from the 
Arab nationalists posed serious threat to British power 
in Iran, Iraq and Turkey had proclaimed their 
neutrality through Saadabad Pact signed between them 
in 1937. It further weakened the British defence 
system. Britain once again felt the need of befriending 
the Soviet Union to counter the Nazi-Fascist menace. 
The Anglo-Soviet Agreement of January 1942 also known 
as the Tripartite Agreement forced Iran to give up the 
policy of neutrality. Simultaneously British armed 
intervention in Iraq suppressed the anti British 
government of Rasheed Al-Qaylani. Nonethe rulers the 
Saadabad Pact: This Treaty was signed between Iran and 
Iraq in Tehran. According to this Treaty they sincerely 
desirous to consolidating thebonds of brotherly 
friendship and good understanding between the two 
states, and in order to definitely settle the frontier 
question between their two countries, have decided to 
conclude the present treaty and for this purpose have 
appointed as their Plenipotentiaries. 
Sharma, R.C.,(ed.), Perspectives on Iran-Iraq Conflict. 
Rajesh Publications, New Delhi, 1984, p.197. 
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war brought an end to the Pax Britannica. as Britain 
entered the process of winding up its power is most of 
the Arab territories . 
Gulf After World War II: 
After the world war second, the Soviet refusal to 
vacate the Iranian province of Azerbaijan and its 
support to the Tudeh Party, its claim on northern 
Turkey and its demand for a joint control over the 
Black Sea, revived the threat to the independence of 
the southern Periphery situated countries of the Soviet 
Union. The creation of the Zionist State of Israel in 
the heart of the Arab lands and the west's drive to 
bring more countries under its control through military 
pacts further aggravated the danger to the independence 
of the Gulf states. The Arab nationalists mounted 
pressure on the west for the liberation of their 
territories and termination of the unequal treaties, 
and this time Britain turned to America to save its 
interests. The Truman Doctrine of 1947 was largely 
aimed at preparing the western military offensive 
6. Asopa, S.K., Op.cit., p.6. 
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against the Soviet Union which at the time appeared to 
be a threat to the remnants of British interest in the 
region. The Northern Tier Alliance, Jointly, sponsored 
by Britain and the United States brought Turkey, Iran, 
Iraq and Pakistan to the American fold. In view of the 
US policy of 'containment', the Baghdad Pact was 
treated by Washington as a Cordon Sanitaire against the 
Soviet expansion in the Gulf. The Pact was expected to 
oppose the danger coming from the Arab Sates to 
Britain's oil interests in Iraq and other Gulf Sates. 
But the Iraq's withdrawal in July 1954 caused a severe 
blow to Britain's oil interest, besides it lost its 
credibility in the Arab world . 
However, the Iraqi revolution of 1958 set a trend 
towards radicalism of the West Asian region. The 
Eisenhover Doctrine especially designed to protect the 
Eisenhower Doctrine: President Eisenhower's generosity 
was overtaken by events when in July 1958, the 
government of Iraq was overthrown by a group of radical 
army officers. In an attempt to counter unease amongst 
the other pact member, Eisenhower proposed an 
"Executive agreement" between each of the pact members 
(apart from Iraq) and the US, on a bilateral basis, 
which guaranteed the security of each state in the 
event of external threat. 
7. Ibid pp. 8-9. 
62 
American clients from the pressure of Arab nationalists 
was turned futile by these developments. The Arab 
States collectively voted against the presence of the 
foreign troops on the Arab Soil in the 29th session of 
the U.N. General Assembly. In this situation America 
supplies arms to Iran Saudi Arabia and Israil be 
further enhanced. With the growth of the U.S. interests 
in the region the Soviet Union also gave military aid 
Q 
to Egypt, Syria and Iraq . The growing influence of the 
Soviet Union posed a threat to traditional Arab 
monarchies. To save their position Prsident Nixion 
offered his Guam Doctrine 1969 in which the U.S. 
offered support to its client states for the formation 
of regional security organisation which would find 
Asian Solutions for Asian Problems. Later on after the 
Iranian revolution the American strategy was updated 
through Carter Doctrine of 1980 Just to salvage the 
Q 
western interests in the Gulf region . 
There are eight Gulf countries, these are Iran, 
8. Amir Sadeghi, N., Op.cit., p.65. 
9. Asopa, S.K., Op.cit., p.10. 
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Iraq, Kuwait, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Oman and 
the United Arab Emirates. UAE is a loose federation of 
the Trucial coast Sheikhdoms formed in July 1971 after 
the British withdrawal from the Gulf. These all states 
differ in matters of political orientations, foreign 
policy and defence but the only things common between 
the Gulf states are oil and Islam. I will discuss each 
state separately just to explain briefly the political 
history of each member state. 
IRAN 
Iran is the most populous country of the region 
situated along the north eastern coast of the Gulf and 
the modern history of Iran begins after Reza Khan's 
coming to power in 1921 who overthrew the Qajar 
Dynasty. He himself proclaimed as king of Iran in 1925. 
Reza Khan was a despotic monarch. He wanted to 
If Reza Khan was a Soldier in Cossaik Brigadier (Russia) 
and Qatar Dynasty's last king Ahmad Shah was ruling in 
Iran. The country was in grip of economic, political 
and social crises. Ahmad Shah had left for England for 
treatment. Under these circumstances there was urgent 
need of the Shah to look into the overwhelming 
problems. But he could not came back to Iran. Reza Khan 
exploiting the situation used force to topple the 
government or bring about a coup-de'tat. 
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modernize the country and desired to rule according to 
the constitution of 1906. Reza Khan's ambition to make 
Iran strong and keep it neutral in the war threatend 
the British interests as the Shah was trying to counter 
the British influence by going closer to Nazi Germany. 
In face of these developments, Britain turned to seek 
Soviet help in keeping Iran in check. "It concluded the 
^Tripartite Agreement of January 1942 which provided 
for the joint Anglo-Soviet Occupation of Iran". Later 
on this agreement had provided for the withdrawal of 
occupation troops and the British forces withdrew in 
1945. But the Soviet Union wanted oil concessions in 
the north eastern Iran and sought representation for 
Soviet sponsored Tudeh party in the Iranian Majlis. 
This conflict with the Soviet Union and the breakdown 
The treaty of 1942z,refered to as Tripartite Agreement 
which was concluded between Iran, Britain and the 
Soviet Union. Under this agreement the allied powers 
had undertaken to safeguard the economic existence of 
Iranian people against the deprivation and difficulties 
arising as a result of war. It was also aimed at 
respecting the soveriegnty and territorial integirity 
of Iran, They pledged to withdraw their forces from 
Iran not later than six months after the end of 
hostilities. It was repeated by the Anglo-American 
Soviet Declaration of December 1943. 
For details of the text> please see Hurewitz, 
Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East, p.p.232-34. 
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of Iran's oil industry owing to its conflicts with 
Britain, the Shah turned to seek the support of the 
United States, which ultimately led Iran into joining 
the US sponsored Bughdad Pact in 1955. Having joined 
the Baghdad Pact it became a focus of condemnation both 
from Russia and the Arab nationalists. America gave 
assurance to Iran for the modernization of the 
country 
The only competitor of Iran in the Gulf was Saudi 
Arabia, which also cherished a desire of becoming a 
regional super power. Iran concentrated on a massive 
arms build up and consumed petrodollars in arms imports 
just to counter the Saudi desire. However under Nixon's 
Guam Doctrine, Iran came to be treated as a key country 
along with Saudi Arabia and Israel and got massive arms 
supplies from US. Iran joined the OPEC with radical 
Arab countries like Libya, Algeria and Iraq and its 
Islamic ties with Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Oman 
manifested its diplomatic skill with the West Asian 
States and the Algiers Agreement was passed in 1975 on 
10. Jha, A.N., Op.Cit., p.14. 
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the part of Arab OPEC countries, to solve the border 
dispute and peace within the OPEC members . But the 
entire scenario of peace stability and good 
neighbourliness suffered a serious setback when the 
Islamic revolution in Iran took place under the 
leadership of Ayatollah Khomeinei overthrew the Shah 
and established an Islamic Republic in 1979. 
IRAQ 
Iraq is also one of the most important country of 
the Gulf. Iraq acquired a separate political identity 
following the break down of the Ottoman Empire in 1919. 
Iraq attained independence in 1932. The Hashemite 
monarchy of Iraq and its pro-British Prime Minister 
Nuri-as-Said kept Iraq indirectly aligned with Britain 
until 1958. The military revolution of 14 July 1958 
under the leadership of Abdul Karim Kassem overthrew 
the monarchy and brought an end to British influences 
by drawing Iraq out of the Baghdad Pact in July 1959 
and joined OPEC in 1960. With the influence of the 
Baath Party which came into power in 1968, Iraq under 
11. Europa, The Middle east and North Africa. 1986, 
p.387. 
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the leadership of President Ahmad Hasan-Al-Bakr (1968-
79) and his Vice Resident Saddam Hussain in July 1979 
has emerged as one of the highly modernized, stable and 
radical state in the Gulf region . After the 
revolution of 1958 Iraq kept itself away from the west 
and this process started with the Iraqi withdrawal from 
the Baghdad Pact 1959 and culminated in the Soviet 
Iraqi Treaty of Co-operation and Friendship in 1975. 
Baath Party also developed closer links with the left 
wing parties namely the communist Party and the Kurdish 
Democratic Party (KDP). Iraq since the termination of 
monarchy had been insisting on Arab Unity based on Pan 
Arabism and Arab Socialism. 
Iraq's relation with Iran deteriorated in the 
seventees protesting against Iran's occupation of the 
Gulf Islands of Abu Musa and the Tumbs. The conflict 
13 
over Shatt-al-Arab also took a serious turn . After 
Khomeinei coming in power these conflicts were 
continued and ultimately resulted in Iran-Iraq war 
which broke out in September 1980. 
12. Asopa, S.K., Op.Cit., pp.18-19. 
13. ibid, p.21. 
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Saudi Arabia 
Saudi Arabia is the largest state in the Gulf 
region. It is bordered on the north by Jordan and Iraq 
and on the west by the Red Sea. During the Ottoman 
Empire, Saudi Arabia was ruled by the Turks. King 
Hussain of Hejaz (Father of king Faisal of Iraq and 
king Abdulla of Jordan) ruled Hejaz as a Lieutenant of 
the Turks and then nominee of the British. Abdul Aziz 
bin Saud invaded Hejaz and defeated Hussain in 1925-
1927. The Treaty of Jeddah was concluded between Saud 
and the British, after which Ibne Saud became the king 
of Saudi Arabia and Britain recognised his sovereignty 
over Hejaz and Nejd. In recognition of the British 
support Ibne Saud accepted the special status of 
British protected Trucial coast Sheikhdoms. Ibne Saud 
could not save his country from external turmoil and in 
1958 Saud was forced to transfer full authority to the 
crown Prince Faisal who was the Deputy Prime Minister 
of the Kingdom. But owing to the intrigues in the house 
of Saud, Faisal could not assume full control of the 
government untill 1964. After coming in power Faisal 
modernized the country and on the external affairs 
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Faisal made an effort to revive Arab Unity on the basis 
of Pan Islamism but he failed. In June 1967 Arab Israel 
war turned the situation in Saudi Arabia's favour. The 
1973 war further opened the opportunity for expanding 
14 
Its influance in the region . 
KUWAIT 
The origin of the present city of Kuwait dates 
back to the beginning of the 18th century and the 
foundation of the present ruling Sabah dynasty is from 
1956 when the Settlers of Kuwait decided to appoint a 
Sheikh to administer their affairs. However in this 
period Kuwait was not separate from the Arab Territory. 
Sheikh Mubarak from (1896 to 1915) marked the status of 
Kuwait from the Sheikhdom. Sheikh Mubarak's son 
succeeded by his son Sheikh Salim and Sheikh Salim was 
succeeded by his nephew Sheikh Ahmed al Jabir. In his 
reign the oil was drilled with the Gulf oil corporation 
and Anglo Persian oil Company. After constant persuance 
in 1911 by the Britishers, ruler of Kuwait (Sheikh 
Mubarak) permitted a group of experts in 1913 to carry 
14. ibid, pp.23-24. 
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a geological survey in order to discover oil in Kuwait. 
British Petroleum and Gulf oil Corporation (USA) 
jointly and equally owned Kuwait oil company. "The 
15 final agreement was signed on 23rd December 1934" . In 
1950 Sheikh Ahmed died and was succeeded by Sheikh 
Abdul!a-As-Salim, who turned the Kuwait into a planned 
and. well equiped country. In 1961 Kuwait become fully 
independent, the ruling Sheikh took the new title of 
Amir and Kuwait was admitted as a member of the Arab 
Leaque. Before 1967 Kuwait was neutral in the Arab 
politics and in 1967. However, in the Arab-Israeli 
warof June 1967, Kuwait supported fully to the Arab 
countries. In 1971 elections, the crown was appointed 
as Prime Minister. In 1977 the Amir (Sheikh Sabah) died 
and was succeeded by his cousin, the crown Prince 
Sheikh Jabir-al-Ahmed al-Sabah who had been Prime 
Minister since 1966. In Iran-Iraq war Kuwait supported 
Iraq. In may 1981 Kuwait joined the Gulf Cooperation 
Council. It was hoped that the Q.C.C. will increase the 
15. Khouja, M.W., and Sadler, P.S., "The Economy of 
Kuwait". Macm4llan Press, London, 1979, p.22. 
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security of the small oil producing states of the 
Gulf^®. 
QATAR 
Qatar lies in south east of Kuwait with a small 
population. Qatar was formerly dominated by the Khalifa 
family of Bahrain. After the world war first, United 
Kingdom recognised Sheikh Abdulla-al-Thani as ruler of 
Qatar. Qatar was ruled under the protection of British. 
If 1961 Qatar joined the OPEC. In 1960 Sheikh Ali-al-
Thani abdicated in favour of his son Sheikh Ahmad-al-
Thani . In 1968 the British government announced to 
withdraw British forces from the Persian Gulf by 1971 
and Qatar was released on 1 September 1971 from the 
British. Sheikh Khalifa who has ruled Qatar from 1972 
joined the proposed federation of Gulf Sheikhdoms but 
later decided to stay out. Qatar having sunni 
population feels religious and emotional attachment 
16. Europa, The Middle East and North Aferica. 1986. 
(See in detail), p.p. 514-16. 
17. Tietzel, M., (edited). Oil Shock. Federal Republic 
of Germany, 1979 p.p. 78-80. 
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18 
with the Islamic state of Saudi Arabia . Qatar has 
good relations with Saudi Arabia and other Sheikhdoms 
and also maintained its old links with Britain. It has 
started bilateral relations with the Soviet Union. 
BAHRAIN 
Bahrain lies in the Gulf between Qatar and Saudi 
Arabian coast. It is a group of 33 Islands of which 
Bahrain is the largest. Bahrain remained colonized 
under the Purtuguese until the 16th century, Persians 
(1602-1782) and in 1862 under the British protectorate 
which continued there until 1971. After the withdrawal 
of British, Iran and Arabs had tried to occupy it. But 
the United Nations had decided to declare it as an 
independent state. Bahrain had joined the federation of 
the Sheikhdoms but later decided to stay out. Bahrain 
is a pioneer in social and economic modernization among 
the Gulf countries. Bahrain's main attention remains 
focussed on maintaining its independence. Sovereignty 
and territorial integrity. Bahrain has maintained 
closer links with Britain and has good relation with 
18. Bhargava, P., Political Economy of the Gulf States. 
S.A. Publisher, New Delhi, 1989, p.p. 66-68. 
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the Gulf Sheikhdoms. 
OMAN 
After 1970 the Oman and Muscat is called as 
Sultanat of Oman. The presence of British colonialism 
in Oman had been a constant irritant to the Arab 
nationalists. However, Oman become independent and 
became the member of the United Nations in 1972. 
Actually the country comprises of three region (a) Ras-
ul-jabal the tip of the Oman Peninsula which blocks the 
entrance to the Gulf at the Strait of Hormuz. (b) Oman 
itself (c) Dhofar in the South West is bordering the 
South Yemen in the west. Sultan said Ben Taymour was 
the Sulatn since 1932. He was forced to abdicate in 
19 
July 1970 in favour of his son Qabus Ben Said . Qabus 
restored the relations with the G.C.C. and he developed 
the country by providing all modern facilities to its 
people. However, the Dhofar movement with the external 
linkages was the internal threat to her security and 
integirity of the country. These Dhofar rebels got help 
from the radical Arab Sates and the Soviet Union where 
19. Asopa, S.K., Op.Cit. pp.31-32. 
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as the Sultan is getting help from the western sates in 
20 
maintaining the control over the entire ^ 
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES ([iAE)*( n^ c*'''-^°X cir^ ^^ x 
United Arab Emirates is a groupr^ -^ of sevejV^ ' 
Sheikhdoms situated on southern coast of the Gulf is 
known as Trucial coast. These Sheikhdoms are; Abu-
Dhabi, Umm-al-Qaiwan, Dubai, Ajman, Fujaira, ras-al-
Khaima and Sharja, These Sheikhdoms began to organize 
co-operation between themselves through a quasi federal 
permanent council, headed by British resident in 1952. 
U.A.E. was fully controlled by the British till 1968, 
when Britain decided to wind up its base in Sharja and 
declared that British protection over the Sheikhdoms 
21 
Will be terminated in 1971 . These Sheikhdoms decided 
to form a federation and made a constitution to manage 
their affairs. This Federation provides a President and 
Vice-President. The ruler of Abu-Dhabi is the President 
of UAE and ruler of Dubai is the vice-president. The 
UAE has good relations with Saudi Arabia, Qatar and 
20. Bhargava, P., Op.cit. pp.82-83. 
21. Asopa, S.K., Op.cit., p.32. 
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Kuwait because of their traditional and cultural 
relations . However, just to save the Sheikhdoms they 
formed a Gulf co-operation council in 1981 which aims 
at forging an integrated front to counter the external 
pressures. 
22. Khalifa, A.M., The UAE. Unity in Fragmentation. 
Croom Helm, London, 1979, p.p. 20-23. 
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CHAPTER - III 
Gulf Mutual Relations & Arabs-Gulf Relations: 
"Since the regionalism does not grow in vacuum, 
its success or failure will have to be assessed and 
analysed in terms of the forces that promote its 
growth. Its social legitimacy depends on the socio-
economic and political interests which are served by 
regional co-operation. Power commanding local hegemonic 
groups as well as foreign economic and political actors 
play a determining role in the performance of the 
mutual relations' . For the growth of mutual relations, 
technology has been the decisive factor which influence 
the global environment to its favour in all dimensions 
i.e. strategic, economic and political. 
However, the Gulf mutual relations depend 
completely upon their individual interests. Since the 
withdrawal of the British forces from the Gulf, the 
relation within the Gulf states have been improving. 
The talk of a Gulf security pact among the gulf's eight 
littoral states had been circulating since the early 
1. Pant, G. 'Political Economy of Regional Cooperation, 
Foreign Affairs Reports. July, August, 1985, vol. 
xxxiv. No.788. 
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1970's. Such a pact, it was argued, that it would 
provide a joint defence network against external 
threats. Despite the approval of such a pact by all the 
eight states, the implementation of this pact proved 
impossible. In the meeting of Gulf foreign ministers in 
Mascut in December 1976 it was realised that all the 
eight states could not agree on a common formula. 
Essentially, the problem was Iran and Iraq. Without 
these two states the other six states formed a very in 
compatible group. Iraq, however, was a source of 
mistrust because of its radical Pan Arab socialist 
ideology. Iran was suspected because it was non-Arab 
and suspicions lingered of centuries-old percieved 
2 
efforts at Persian hegemony in the Gulf . But the Iran-
Iraq war removed these two countries from the Gulf 
security pact as well as from the mutual relationship 
from the Gulf States. 
The remaining six states formed a cohesive group 
because some similarities are found in their political, 
economic and social systems. All these six states 
2. Peterson, J.E., Defending Arabia.Croom Helm, London, 
1986, pp.216-17. 
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maintained close ties since the early 1970s. Other 
states like Sheikh-doms members as well as Behrain and 
Qatar had taken place in the late 1960s. A federation 
talk in the economic arena in which a number of joint 
projects had been initiated under the organization of 
Arab Petroleum Exporting countries (OAPEC) . The 
Saudi's provided financial aid and some small arms to 
Oman during the Dhufar rebellion, the UAE paid money to 
Oman to release the forces for duty in Dhufar. Despite 
these political backing some mistrust had emerged 
within the Gulf states. To finish these mistrust Sheikh 
Jabir-al-Sabah (Prime Minister and Amir of Kuwait) 
called a meeting in May 1976 for the establishment of a 
Gulf Union with the objective of realising cooperation 
in all economic, political, educational and 
informational fields. In Feb. 1981 the six foreign 
ministers met in Riyadh to set down the text of the 
Gulf cooperation which shows ultimately the mutual 
relations of the Gulf sates . The objectives of the 
3. Khalifa, A.M., The United Arab Emirates, unity in 
Fragmentation, Boulder Co, Westview Press, London, 
1979. p.p. 13-15. 
4. Yorke.V., 'Bid For Gulf Unity,' The World Today 
Vol.37, No.7-8, 1981, pp. 246.9. 
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meeting were: 
(a) To affect coordination, integration and inter-
connection between member states in a11 fields 
in order to achieve unity among them. 
(b) To deepen and strengthen relations, link and 
enlarge cooperations now prevailing between 
these people in various fields. 
(c) To strengthen the fields including economic, 
financial affairs, education and culture, 
social,legislative and administrative affairs. 
(d) To stimulate scientific and technological 
progress: 
{i) To achieve all round cooperation among 
member-states in order to bring about their 
progress and prosperity, 
(ii) To deepen and strengthen existing bonds of 
cooperation, 
(iii) To draw up similar systems in all fields 
including economic and financial, trade, 
customs and transport, educational and 
cultural, health and social, information and 
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tourism,and judicial and administrative, and; 
(iv) To promote scientific and technical progress 
in industry minerals, agriculture, sea wealth 
and animal wealth and to establish scientific 
research centres and collective projects and 
to encourage the private sector's cooperation 
for the good of the people of the member-
5 
States . In the fields of industry and 
agriculture, water and animal resources, 
(v) The establishment of scientific research 
centre, implementation of common projects and 
encouragement of the coopertaion for the 
welfare of their people . 
Besides these cooperations in the economic sphere 
the "Unified Economic Agreement" was drawn up in 1981 
and implemented in political terms. 
To negotiate the hostilities between Iran and 
Iraq, Kuwait and UAE had tried to seek a peaceful 
solution to end the Gulf war and they had tried so many 
5. Sreedhar, The Gulf. Scramble for Security. ABC, 
Pub.House, New Delhi, 1983, p.121. 
6. ibid, p.121. 
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times and visited their capitals but no solution had 
taken place, and then U.S. Secretary of states, George 
Shultz had solved this problem after negotiating talks. 
But the relations of these two countries are not 
matched with the other six Gulf states. Nonetheless the 
relations among the six states are improving 
continuously. 
However, in terms of Gulf-Arab on inter Arab-
relations, the political and economic factors are 
playing a dominant role in the region. The dominant 
feature of the inter-Arab relations is the struggle for 
the leadership in the name of Arab-Unity. But the 
regional Arab politics has been concerned with the 
problem of Arab-Unity, although the Arab-Gulf relations 
is closely linked since 1948 and this relationship has 
been a collective position towards Israel. However, 
since 1950s regional Arab politics and Arab Gulf 
relations have also been concerned with the 
relationship of the Arab states to the outside powers 
and their positions in the context of rivalry between 
the superpowers . 
7. Hammond, P.Y.(ed.).Political Dynamics in the Middle 
East. New York, 1972, pp. 31-33. 
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Although, to promote the inter-Arab 
relations, there was the Palestine question which until 
1937 was a local matter between the Arab and a Jewish 
communities in Palestine and the British authority. To 
solve this problem a Royal commission was appointed in 
1936 to look into the Palestine question. Later, in 
1947, the U.N. recommended the partition of the country 
into Arab and Jewish States. The Arab states held a 
conference and decided to fight against Israel. The 
ultimate result was the 1948 Palestine war. 
After this war all the Arab states became close to 
each other and formed an organisation in the name of 
Arab Nationalist Movement under the impact of (a) 
military regime (b) Parties with ideological 
Pretensions e.g. the Baath in the fertile crescent area 
and the Palestinians (c) the use of single party 
organisations (d) the failure of western attempts at 
regional defence or other mutual security arrangement 
o 
(e) the continuation of the conflict with Israel . 
Between 1948 to 1958 inter-Arab relations were 
8. Allan, G.G. Unwin, Conflict in the Middle East. 
London, 1971, Chapter-2,4. 
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dominated by the two traditional rival centres of Arab 
powers, Egypt in the Nile valley and Iraq in 
Mesopotamia. Syria had joined Egypt in 1958 to form the 
United Arab Republic (U.A.R.). A period of sharp 
conflict between Cairo and Baghdad from 1959 to 1963 
followed, despite their mutual commitment to the cause 
of Arab Unity. After 1963 the inter Arab relations had 
deteriorated. Egypt was at odds with Syria, Saudi 
Arabia, Jordan, and even Iraq, and Syria was at odds 
with Iraq. These differences were preceded by a last 
attempt on the part of the revolutionary Arab socialist 
states of Syria and Iraq to seek a union with Egypt but 
their efforts did not succeeded. 
In order to deal with the matter of Israel without 
recourse to war Egypt convinced its sister Arab states 
to organize the Palestine liberation organisation 
(P.L.O.) which worried king Hussein of Jordan. By 1966, 
the era of Arab reconci11iation was over. Thereafter, 
the Saudi king Faisal launched a campaign to form an 
Islamic Bloc to which king Hussein of Jordan lent his 
support. Syria almost clashed with Iraq over the 
transport royalties from the Iraqi Petroleum Company, 
S3 
whose oil pipeline which passes through Syrian 
territory. In view of these developments President 
Nasser of Egypt had to prove his concern for the 
Palestinian, in order to assert his leadership of the 
Arab Revolution. Egypt was, at that time facing 
problems at home and abroad. His army was stuck in 
Yemen, and internally, country was in the grip of 
rising economic problems. Saudi Arabia launched a 
financial campaign against him. He suspected that it 
was inspired by The Americans. Under these 
g 
circumstances he felt compelled for a showdown . 
A major consequence of the 1967 defeat for inter-
Arab Relations was its effect on the Cairo-Riyadh 
confrontation. The immediate question was that of a 
settlement with Israel. Nasser could not, of course, 
contemplate such a step without wider, Arab support, 
Primarily because his prestige had been shattered. The 
1967 war ended the sharp polarization of the Arab 
states between radical, and the conservatives and 
reconciled monarchies and republic in the agony, of 
9. Vatikiotis, P.J..Arab and Regional Politics in the 
Middle East. Croon Helm, London, 1984, p.87. 
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shame and defeat. Due to this all the Arab states has 
reconciled their differences and these states made a 
collective effort to defeat Israel even the 
Palestinians organised the Palestine Resistant Movement 
in a more radical form and then the oil rich states in 
the Peninsula and the Gulf started to aid Egypt. Syria 
and the Palestinians since 1967 as a matter of paying 
protection money to the trouble makers . 
The October 1973 war did not lead to decrease the 
inter-Arab rivalry for leadership. It did however 
affect, the form and level of the conflict. The Gulf 
Arab relations are now to a great extent dominated by 
the availability of the so called 'oil weapon'. 
In the November 1973 and October 1974 Arab summits 
(Algiers and Rabat) a formula for the integration of 
Palestinians into the official pattern and mainstream 
in inter-Arab relations was formed. The formula was 
that the PLO agrees to abide by the leadership of the 
Cairo-Riyadh axis in return for its recognition as the 
sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian 
peop'^ e. The perception of the October war and its 
10. ibid,p.88. 
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achievements by the Arabs was revealing and relevent 
factor in the inter-Arab relations. For the Egyptians, 
it constituted a new departure that provided them room 
for maneouvre both in regional Arab and international 
diplomacy with Saudi backing. Egypt's option for 
gradual negotiations with Israel became more acceptable 
to other Arabs, more significant for inter Arab 
relations . 
In view of the nature and main features of inter-
Arab relations presented above the sharp new 
differences perforce engendered between the very rich 
oil producing Arab states and those less naturally 
endowed are a major factor in this instability. At the 
same time the Arabs have tended since the Oct. war to 
use oil as tactical weapon to press Europe and the U.S. 
towards an anti-Israeli policy. Later on Dr. 
Kissinger's successful "Shuttle Diplomacy" in 1975 
generated further conflicts within the Arab 
territories. 
However, the relations between the Arab states 
will continue to carry the seeds of Inter-Arab 
11. ibid, p.91. 
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dissensions and diversion over (a) the Arab-Israel 
conflict (b) economic matters (c) relations with Europe 
and super-powers (d) regional and sub regional 
rivalries. The controversy over oil prices, oil 
production and the confrontation between Iran and the 
Arab states in the Gulf,all constitute sources of 
12 
tension of potential conflict . In the more radical 
form the following point, affected the inter Arab 
relations. 
1. A division between rich oil producing states 
on one hand (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Gulf sates, 
Iraq, Libya) and on the other those states not 
so naturally endowed (Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, 
Tunisia and the Yemens). In these groups 
within • the Arab world, there is also 
disparities in development. The richest among 
them are also by and large, the least 
developed economically. Socially and 
politically. Many of them such as Kuwait and 
the Gulf states, employ in their current 
programmes of development large number of 
12. ibid, pp.108-112. 
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expatriates from other Arab states 
particularly, Egypt, Kuwait, Iraq and the 
Lebanon and many Asian Countries. These 
constitute not a wholly comforting or 
reassuring intrusion for the peninsula and 
Gulf sates. 
2. Syria and Iraq can concievably become 
economically self sufficient state given the 
size of their population and resources. 
However, Syria will depend to some extent on 
financial aid from some of the oil producing 
states like Saudi Arabia, U.A.E. in the 
struggle against Israel. 
3. Syria and LebotfOT? both have oil pipline 
terminals on their costs. They would be 
interested to get income from them. Iraq and 
saudi Arabia are also interested in the 
security and continuous of these pipe lines. 
To this extent the economics of overland oil 
transport is a factor in these inter-Arab 
relation. 
4. The structural differences in the economies of 
94 
Arab states constitute a relevant factor in 
inter-Arab relations. Egypt and Jordan are the 
least favourably placed in the oil game. 
Egypt's internal agreement with Israel on 
sinai, Cairo may strike its rich oil fields in 
western desert. Inevitably, the current 
dependance constitutes a constraint upon 
Egypt's freedom of action in relation to 
Israel and the wider area of inter-Arab 
relations. 
5. If by some good fortune the Arab-Israel 
conflict is peacefully settled or resolved, 
one can expect a deterioration in inter-Arab 
relations, with economic overtones. So far, 
the rich Arab states, for their own purposes, 
can use their financial resources for the 
maintenance of the conflict at relatively 
little expense to themselves and in the 
meantime, derive maximum benefit in the 
struggle for Arab leadership. 
6. However, only Egypt among these states really 
entertaines hopes of a wider inter-Arab 
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economic role by virtue of its relatively vast 
human resources. The Syrians and Iraqis could 
conceivably compete. So far only the Lebanese 
1 3 
have done so credibly . To this extent also 
Egypt will maintain an interest in an 
integrative kind of Arab economic development. 
However, since the October war, the tendency in 
inter-Arab relations has been one of eschewing the old 
objective and ideology of Arab unity in favour of 
solidarity, based on a convergence of the interests of 
individual Arab states. This was manifested in the use 
of the oil weapon (coordinated policies of Egypt,Saudi 
Arabia and Syria) against Israel, and against its 
European and American friends. Nevertheless, the most 
likely development in the immediate future will be one 
of the consolidation of several Locus of Arab power, 
for example, Saudi Arabia in the Peninsula allied with 
Egypt. To this extent the whole area of inter-Arab 
relations between Arab and non-Arab states in the 
Middle East, as well as with Europe and the 
superpowers, will remain dangerously problematic. 
13. ibid, pp. 97-100. 
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CHAPTER - IV 
Gulf And The Super Powers: 
(Economic & Political Interests): 
The super powers s^ trategy in the Gulf revolves 
around the oil producing areas of the region, and had 
emerged on the Gulf Scene long before British formally 
decided to quit the area. Right from the days of 
establishment of 'Arabian-American oil Company' the 
foremost concern of the United States had been to 
safeguard the uninterrupted flow of oil to the western 
hemisphere. To strengthen the position of its oil 
Companies in the oil producing countries, it was 
expedient for America to establish close relations with 
Saudi Arabia and Iran . 
Although, the Soviet interests is not directly 
related to oil but its interest, centres around the oil 
producing areas. The Soviet policy on the other hand 
has been always to obstruct the supply of oil to the 
west by promoting radical regimes in the oil rich 
states of the Gulf. So, the region for which America 
feels compelled to support the conservative monrachies 
1. Asopa, S.K., 011 Arms and Islam in the Gulf. Print-
well Publisher, Jaipur, 1986, p.97. 
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are not much dissimilar from the reasons compelling the 
Soviet Union to dismantle or atleast weaken them. 
Precisely, the super-power's policy in this region, in 
the fifties and the sixties evolved in the form of 
reaction to each other's political and diplomatic 
overones in and around the oil states and the same 
trend continues to exist. 
American Interest in the Gulf: 
American interests in the Gulf region relate on 
the one hand to the oil reserves in the Gulf and on the 
other to the Gulf's geo-strategic position in the 
south-western flank of the Soviet Union. The 
significance of the Gulf for the world's oil supplies 
point to the geo-strategic necessity of preventing the 
Soviet Union from gaining control of the region. In 
addition to oil, the region is of crucial importance in 
the over all context of the East-West conflict. 
The American strategy in the formative phase 
concentrated on developing pacts and alliances along 
the south western flank of the Soviet Union and forging 
close bilateral cooperation with the key states of the 
93 
region. The U.S. policy in this area was motivated to 
safeguard the oil producing states against the possible 
Soviet encroachment. The policy of 'containment of 
communism' and "encirclement of the USSR' clearly aimed 
at forming a cordon Sanitaire to arrest the expansion 
of Soviet power and influence in the direction of the 
2 
Gulf . The 1 end-Lease Programme, the Truman Doctrine 
(1947) and the formation of Baghdad Pact including 
Turkey, Iran and Iraq had all been the part of American 
strategy to defend its oil interests in the Gulf region 
and ensure the west's security. 
Strategical Dimensions of the United States: 
To build up a strong hold over the Gulf region 
America developed a vested interest in the protection 
of Iran and Saudi Arabia, which between them accounted 
for about two third of the Middle East oil production. 
Iran's geographic proximity with the Soviet Union, its 
geo-strategic importance in the protection of the oil 
rich states of the Gulf were considered useful in the 
advancement of America's economic and military interest 
in the region. With the establishment of bilateral 
2. ibid, p.98. 
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military relationship between the two, America 
increased the arms supplies to Iran, which turned the 
latter into a strong "bulwork" against the Soviet 
pressures from the north. 
"The kingdom of Saudi Arabia applied its 
diplomatic skill in emasculating the demand for using 
oil as a "political weapons" against the industrialized 
world on the issue of partition of Palestine (1948) 
during the Suez War (1956) and again during the June 
3 
1967 Arab-Israeli war . Having knowledge of the Saudi 
Solidarity with the interests of the United States and 
its total lack of feeling towards the radical 
nationalist ideologies propagated by the frontline Arab 
States made it an extremely dependable ally of the 
United Sates. 
A third dimension to America's military strategy 
in the Gulf is provided by Israel. Initially, the US 
interest in Israel was generated under pressure from 
the Jewish lobby in America. Over the years, Israel has 
developed a close identification with the American 
interests in the Gulf area. The June 1967 war in this 
3. ibid, p.99. 
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context served the interest of America and its ally 
Saudi Arabia to the amximum. Israel inflicting a severe 
blow to the power and prestige of radical Arab States 
incapacitated them to the extent that they became 
totally dependent on Saudi aid and support. This 
enabled the Saudis to assume the role of a "great 
patriarch" in the whole Arab region. For America the 
defeat of the radical Arab States which were supported 
by the Soviet weaponary and_diplomatic and military 
skill of Moscow, was experiment to atleast a 
4 
psychological defeat of the Soviet Union . 
In this three pillar strategy Iran, Israel and 
Saudi Arabia came to be regarded as key countries and 
became the main basis of the power of the United Sates 
in West Asia. 
In view of America's desire to keep the wheels of 
her industry moving on which her economic prosperity 
and military might depended, regular supply of oil in 
abundance was the most vital factor. As bulk of her oil 
requirement was being obtained from the Gulf area, it 
became indispensable for her to concentrate on 
4. ibid, pp.,99-100. 
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developing friendly and dependable ties with the 
Iranian and Saudi regimes which possessed two third of 
the Gulf oil reserves. Their economic development and 
security requirements were assumed by the US 
governments. Further as stipulated in Nixon Doctrine, 
America desired the regional security assigned to the 
three "Key States", And in order to enhance their 
defence capability, America should increase military 
supplies provide necessary training and arrange for 
finances. The Nixon Doctrine was a trickly device to 
step up the arms sales of the US with these new 
military commitments in Iran, Israel, Saudi Arabia and 
Kuwait its arms exports stepped up to $4 billion in 
1974 and $4.5 billion in 1975 and the Gulf States 
became its main recipients . 
The American economic and military aid given to 
Iran within the framework of the Baghdad Pact (when 
Iran's joining the 'northern tier' defence called the 
Baghdad Pact in 1955), (known as CENTO after 1959) 
5. Quandt, W.B., U.S.. Policy in the Middle East. 
Choices and constraints. New York, 1970, pp. 484-
548. 
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amounted $500 million and $400 million resepectively 
during 1953-1959 . With this massive aid and 
assisstance , within ten years (1959-69) Iran acquired 
a substantial political and military significance in 
the Middle East, and by 1970 it emerged as the biggest 
buyer of American arms in the region. The U.S. only 
interest in the supply of these arms to Iran was that, 
Iran, by virtue of being close to Soviet border should 
become the strongest power against the Soviet pressure 
in this region. In 1970-1972 the arms transfers from US 
to Iran amounted to more than $3.5 billion which 
further at the rate of nearly a billion a year . 
The happy relationship between Iran and the US was 
seriously offset by the Iranian revolution in January 
1979 which overthrew the Shah and installed the 
conservative Mullah in powers with the mass executions, 
arrest and expulsions of the army men and the conflict 
6. ibid, p.548. 
7. Chubin, S., Zabih, S., The Foreign Relations of 
Iran. Los Angles, London, 1974 pp. 105-106. 
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o 
over the Shah's assets in America and the hostage 
crisis, the US position suffered a further set-back. 
The outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war in September 1980 
created a potential danger for America's strategic and 
economic interests. 
The United States, having knowledge of Soviet 
military presence in Afghanistan and its having Treaty 
relations with Iraq stepped up her arms build up in the 
region. This militarization was considered necessary to 
assure the American clients-Saudi Arabia, Oman, Kuwait 
and the UAE of American assistance in case of any 
threat to their security. To make its, military 
presence in the vicinity of the Gulf, the US tried to 
create a multinational force and requested its allies 
to step up their naval presence in the Arabian Sea and 
8. The Iranians, after the Islamic revolution charged 
the American Embassy in Teheran that it had been 
interfering in internal affairs of Iran and had 
become a Centre for espionage. The radical 
students seized the Embassy on 1980 and made all 
the American staff hostage. The hostage crisis 
lasted for long, over 400 days. The U.S. condemned 
the Iranian action as being against diplomatic 
immunity granted to the foreign national working in 
their embassy. So did the world. But the Iranians 
undeterred the world Condemnation Continued with 
their Seized and proved that the American embassy 
was involved in extra-diplomatic and espionage 
activities. 
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the Indian Ocean area . The number of allied warships 
increased from thirty to sixty in September 1980. With 
the presence of British, French and Australian 
Warships, the US could highlight the solidarity of the 
west in defending its oil interests in the Gulf region. 
However, this multinational arms build-up did not 
make America less offensive to Iran. Khomeini 
interpreted the US neutrality and its denial to supply 
spare parts, for the US made Iranian weapons as an anti 
Iranian act and continued to treat America as its 
enemy number one. For fear of losing Iran to the Soviet 
Union, President Carter was inclined to respond to 
Iranian demand fof- weapons favourably.But in view of 
the anti Iranian sentiments generated in the US over 
its attitude towards the hostage issue, refrained from 
changing his stand. With the recent shift in the Soviet 
policy towards Iraq, the US was once again looking for 
opportunities to reopen its channels of communication 
with Iran. 
9. Asopa, S.K., op.cit., p.103. 
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Arms Deal with Saudi Arabia: 
The Saudi-American relationship, although based on 
mutual reliance was not free from strains. The US 
relationship with Israel is one of the important 
reasons for straining the relationship between the two. 
The American arms sales and supplies of military 
equipments to the oil kingdom have increased in 
enormous proportion since the June 1967 war. In view of 
the forthcoming British withdrawal from the Gulf in 
1971. American Strategists started looking at Iran and 
Saudi Arabia as the future powers in the region and 
with that stepped up the arms sales to these two 
countries . The US military sales to Saudi Arabia 
increased from $1.2 billion in 1972 to $6.5 in 1979 and 
with the loss of Iran as an American ally in 1979, the 
US signed a deal for $35 billion in military contracts 
of which equipments worth $11 billion were delivered in 
1980 and with a further increase during 1979-84 it 
reached to $ 19,900 billion. 
Furthermore the Carter Administration's promised 
10. Foreign Affairs, U.S. Foreign Policy for the 
1970's. Building for peace, 25 Feb., 1971,pp.12-14. 
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sale of F-15 Fighter Crafts to Saudi Arabia (1979) was 
approved by the Reagan Administration immediately 
after his coming to the power. The US agreed to give 
Saudi Arabia 60 F-15 Eagles, the US Air Force's best 
fighter planes, hundreds of M-10 battle tanks and 
thousands of America's first line tactical missiles. 
But the policy of militarization of friendly regimes is 
coming under pressure from the various opposition 
lobbies which are questioning the government's wisdom 
in these arms deals. The controversy was over the 
supply of AWACS (air borne warning and control system) 
given to Saudi Arabia in September 1980 and the promise 
of a further delivery of five AWACS in 1986 made by 
Reagan Administration to Saudi Arabia. 
What makes the deal controversial, is Saudi 
Arabia's strong opposition to military supplies to 
Israel. Another reason which is causing strain in the 
US-Saudi relationship is that the Saudi regime wants 
modern US weapons, high technology and managed skills 
as well as all implicit American military protection 
but at the same time wants to assert its distance from 
the United States, (The Saudi say "Military treat us as 
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your ally"), give us large quantities of your newest 
and best weapons, train our soldiers, build our 
military infrastructure, make clear to our enemies that 
the US will not stand only, if Saudi Arabia is attacked 
so as to avoid antagonizing our Islamic brothers. Do so 
even though we must side with the Arab world when 
conflicts arise with US interests . 
Such attitude was irritating to the Americans 
especially when there were about 40,000 Americans in 
Saudi Arabia of which about 10,000 are engaged in 
military reacted activities. Notwithstanding this, the 
US is seeking permanent bases in Saudi Arabia not only 
to safeguard its oil interest but also in view of Saudi 
Arabia's geostrategic and political importance in the 
global military strategy of the US in West Asia and the 
Indian Ocean region. Although America is fully aware of 
the dangers of putting its high technology and 
sophisticated weaponry in the hands of weak and 
highly vulnerable leadership,but for reasons of its 
11. The Defence Science Monitor Article, The US 
military in Saudi Arabia; Investing instability or 
Disaster, Strategic Digest. Oct. 1981, p.821. 
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security and oil interests tends to ignore them. The 
policy of militarization of friendly regimes in West 
1 2 
Asia were initiated by Nixon's Guam Doctrine (1969) , 
and promoted by Carter Doctrine of 1980, has created 
such a complex web of contradictory alliances between 
the US and Israel at the one hand and the US and Saudi 
Arabia on the other, that Reagon Administration does 
not seem to have been left with any other choice but to 
continue militarizing the both. 
So far as the policy of the US regarding her 
interest in the Gulf region as a whole may be viewed in 
the perspective not only of the political constraints 
12. Chubin, S., Zabih, S., op.cit., p.257. 
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symbolized by the Nixon Doctcine.but also in the light 
of its interests in the region. U.S. interests in the 
region may be categorized in the following categories: 
(a) The Gulf possesses three fuorth of the non-
communist world's oil reserves and accounts 
for one third of world production. 
(b) America's major allies depend on this oil 
which accounts for 90 percent of Japan's oil 
needs and 46 percent of Europe's,the 
indication is that this dependence will 
continue. 
Nixon Doctrine: President Nixon's declaration at Guam 
in June 1969 was an emphasis on self help and regional 
security systems. In essence this doctrine rests on 
three principles. 
1. The US will keep all its treaty commitments. 
2. It will provide a shield if a nuclear power 
threatens the freedom of a nation allied with us or 
a nation whose survival we consider vital to our 
security. 
3. In cases involving other types of aggression, we 
shall furnish military and economic assisstance when 
requested in accordance with our treaty commitments. 
But we shall look to the nation directly threatened 
to assume the primary responsibility of providing 
the manpower for its defense. 
U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's, Building for 
Peace, A Report to the Congress by Richard M. Nixon, 
President of the United States, Feb. 25, 1971, p.p. 
12-14. 
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(c) Increased energy consumption in the U.S. will 
necessitate dependence on the Persian Gulf 
region for the nation's oil requirements. 
(d) The oil industry in the Middle East in all its 
operations accounts for 1.6 billion dollars 
per year U.S. profits. 
(e) Lastly, there were perhaps 12,000 U.S. 
citizens living or working in the Gulf 
region 
Soviet Interests In The Gulf: 
Soviet interests in the Gulf are mainly determined 
by her geographical proximity to the region. Soviet 
interests and objectives in the Gulf may be seen in the 
context of its global strategy and the historic 
development of the Soviet position in West Asia. In 
early times the desire to have access to southern warm 
waters of the Indian Ocean through the Gulf, dominated 
its strategic calculation in the region. The Soviet 
occupation of Iran and its encouragement to the 
communist led Secessionist movement in Azerbaijan and 
13. ibid, p.260. 
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the territorial claims forwarded in the North Eastern 
Turkey, accompanied by the demand for joint control 
over the Black Sea in the post-war period, were to some 
extent motivated by this desire . 
With the increasing American involvement in Iran 
and Turkey following the Truman Poetnne of 1947. 
Soviet Union also shifted its strategy from seeking 
direct control over the bordering areas to countering 
the American diplomacy which manifested in a number of 
offers made by Russia to Iran and Turkey. The agreement 
signed between Iran and the Soviet Union in December 
1954 provided for the repayment of $86 million debt and 
return of 11.2 tons of gold to Iran besides the 
settlement of the border problem. This strategy was 
aimed at dissuading Iran from joining the US-sponsored 
northern tier defence pact known as the Baghdad Pact 
(1955). But the Soviet failure in countering the 
Truman Doctrine: The Truman Doctrine of 1947 was 
largely aimed at preparing the Western military 
offensive against the Soviet Union, which at the time 
appeared to be a threat to the remnants of British 
unterests in the region. 
14. Asopa, S.K., op.cit., p.8. 
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growing influence of America in Iran and Turkey, took 
15 
recourse to sabotaging the American pact 
The first phase to the Baghdad pact solidarity 
came in the form of the Suez crisis in 1956. League of 
the Arab States pressurized Iraq to boycotted the 
meetings of the Baghdad Pact and joined the Arab States 
in criticising Britain an ally in the Pact. After the 
Revolution of 14 July 1958 Iraq left the Baghdad Pact. 
The 'Pact' headquarters then shift to Ankara (Turkey) 
in 1959. The second phase is the Soviet relations with 
the 'nothern tier' states, started with the dawn of 
detente in the East West relations in 1960. Soviet 
Union abandoned the Policy of hostility towards its 
southern neighbours and opened a phase of large scale 
economic cooperation with them. The Soviet with Iran 
initiated in 1962 was reinforced by a wide ranging 
economic ties between the two nations. The Shah's visit 
to Moscow in June 1965 was followed by a $286 million 
credit agreement for the construction of a steel plant 
near Isfahan, a heavy machine plant at Arak and a 
machine tool factory at Tabriz with the Soviet help. 
15. Chubin & Zabih, S., op.cit., p.44-49. 
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Another agreeemnt signed in February 1967 the Soviet 
Union pledged to supply military equipment worth $ 100 
million to Iran which included troop carriers, trucks 
1 6 
and anti tank equipment 
The Soviet policy was aimed at weakening the 
western influence through political and diplomatic 
offensive and establishing Soviet Pre-eminance in the 
region by developing solidarity with the progressive 
regimes. The Soviet interest in the oil states stemmed 
not so much from the importance of oil in the overall 
energy requirement of Soviet Union but from a variety 
of reasons connected with its economic, political and 
ideological objectives. Soviet Union is self reliant in 
oil but its interest in the trading of oil necessitates 
access to the Gulf oil. Soviet Union's desire to 
continue its oil exports to the West European States 
and Japan, made it increasingly interested in the Gulf 
oil which was cheap and easy to get. By controlling the 
outerring of the Arab States surrounding the oil 
producing pro-West monarchies and Sheikhdoms, the 
16. Asopa, S.K., op.cit., pp.111-12. 
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Soviet Union desired to increase its capabilities to 
obstruct the flow of oil to the West. Ideologically, 
Soviet interest in the Gulf is obvious in terms of 
under cutting the Western political and economic 
influence rather than fostering communist take overs. 
Being aware of extreme sensitivity of the Third World 
countries to ideological and political intrusion, 
Soviet Union under Khrushchev developed a new strategy 
which was based on a three fold assumption : 
(a) With its growing military and economic power 
the communist camp could liquidate capitalism 
through peaceful competition, 
(b) The national bourgeoisie in several countries 
of the Third World were endowed with 
progressive potentialities and^ 
(c) Through suitable economic and technical 
assistance the Soviet Union could induce the 
countries of the Third World to adopt non-
capitalist ways of development preparatory to 
their eventual socialist transformation. This 
approach injected a greater flexibility in 
Moscow's attitude towards the Third World 
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countries and minimised the risk of a head on 
clash with the United States . The Arab World 
provided a perfect setting for the 
implementation of this new policy. 
Soviet Union by supporting the Arab neutralism and 
promoting the progressive regimes had already developed 
close links with Egypt and Syria which were further 
strengthened by the Czech arms deal (1955) and Soviet 
support to Egypt's nationalization of the Suez canal. 
The defeat of Egyptian and Syrian armies in the Arab 
Israeli War of 1967, although gave a severe blow to the 
prestige of Soviet clients in the region, make Russia 
to set up the supply of military hardware to Egypt and 
1 8 
Syria . This marked the begining of a new phase in the 
Arab-Soviet relations in which Egypt and Syria became 
dependent on Soviet military and economic aid. 
But after the June 1967 war, the Soviet influence 
in West Asia suffered set back Saudi Arabia pressed 
Egypt to cutoff their relation with Soviet Union. 
17. ibid, p.p., 112-13. 
18. ibid, pp. 113-114. 
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America then initiated a new political link between 
Egypt and Saudi Arabia. On King Faisal's advice Sadat 
expelled the Soviet military from Egypt in 1972 and 
tried to seek American help in securing the evacuation 
of the Arab territories occupied by Israel in the June 
1967 war. However, despite the Egyptian desire, America 
supplied Phantom jets to Israel in early 1973, Egypt, 
was left with no choice but to resort to military 
action against Israel. The solidarity shown by Saudi 
Arabia and reactionary regimes with the Arab cause by 
quadruppling the price of crude oil in the wake of the 
October 1973 war prevented Egypt from getting 
disillusioned with the West and the trend in the 
direction of Egyption American relations continued and 
strengthened by the US efforts in bringing a negotiated 
peace between Egypt and Israel through the camp David 
agreement 
With Egypt totally written off to the West, Soviet 
20 
policy moved on three point : 
19. Cambell, J.C., The Super Powers in the Persian 
Gulf-Region. The Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean 
in International Pol itics, fed.) by Abbas Amirie, 
Tehran, 1975, p.p. 53-55. 
20. Asopa, S.K., op.cit., p.p.114-15. 
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(a) To forge close military alliance with Iraq^ 
(b) To neutralize American influence in Iran by 
developing a relationship of economic 
interdependence with Tehran and^ 
(c) To develop involvement in the oil industry of 
the Gulf region. The Soviet Iraqi Treaty of 
friendship and cooperation (1972) provided the 
closer links between the two. The Soviet Union 
had already procured oil prospecting right in 
the Iraqi areas in 1969. In the military field 
the Soviet Union became the main supplier of 
arms to Iraq. But the Soviet Union started 
getting tried of the ambitious Saddam Hussein 
in the later part of the seventees when he 
tried to assert his independence by taking 
measures offending to Moscow. The Soviet Union 
was particularly disturbed when in 1978 the 
Iraqi government ordered the execution of 
twenty one communist for subverting the army. 
The Baath government withdrew a number of 
Iraqis sent for training to the Soviet Union 
as a protest against their marxist 
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indoctrination. However the joint communique 
issued at the end of the talks between Breznew 
and Hafiz Assad of Syria in Moscow marked a 
radical shift in the attitude of Soviet Union 
towards Iran. 
Soviet Union had started participating in Iran's 
economic planning and development from 1965 when the 
two countries signed a fifteen year agreement for 
economic cooperation. The construction of 800 miles 
long piplines from Khuzistan to the Caspian Sea 
frontier town of Astara for the delivery of Iranian Gas 
to Soviet Union in return for Soviet aid in Iran's 
industrial development was an important landmark in the 
direction of growing inter dependence in economic 
field^^. 
With this economic collaboration with Tehran the 
Soviet Union even went to the extent of supporting the 
reactionary forces during 1979 revolution in Iran. The 
anti-Americanism of Khomeini and his emphasis on 
keeping the country non aligned captured the Soviet 
attention and it tried to win the confidence of the 
21. ibid, p.p. 115-16. 
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ruling elites in Iran. 
But the Gulf war (Iran-Iraq) created an intricate 
situation for the growth of Soviet-1 rani an 
relationship. Russia in view of its Treaty of 
Friendship and cooperation (1972) with Iraq and Iran's 
strategic importance for the Soviet Union adopted a 
neutral stand towards the war, which was interpreted by 
the both as an unfriendly act. Cashing in on the 
estranged relations between Iran and the US, Soviet 
Union through the Tudeh Party^ Local communist elements 
and other left organizations had succeeded in expanding 
its influence over the Ayatullahs. But its failure in 
coming out in open support to Iran against Iraq 
antagonised Khomeini. But both super-powers remained 
silent, than the tension started affecting the economic 
relation as well. The Iranian demand for a fivefold 
increase in the price of the natural gas, Trunkline 
(IGAT) was rejected by Moscow. In retaliation Iran 
closed Soviet consulate and Soviet diplomatic presence 
in Tehran and restricted the entry of Soviet pressman 
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22 
and reporters . 
When Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister Mr, Tariq Aziz 
visited Moscow than Iran condemned the Soviet Union for 
supporting the Baathist regime. The uneasy laison came 
to an end when seven Tudeh members were arrested on the 
charge of spying for the Soviet Union in 1983 Khomeini 
also expelled eight members of the Russian diplomatic 
staff from Tehran. The crucial turning point in the 
Iran-Soviet relations came in 1983 when Soviet Union 
decided to resume the arms shipments to Iraq which has 
23 
also been given military assistance by France . 
22. Zabih, S., Iran Since the Revoluion. Croom Helm, 
London, 1985,p.p. 164-166. 
23. Hero, D., Iran Under the Avatullahs. Routledge and 
Kegan Paul, London, 1987, pp. 290-292. 
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CHAPTER - V 
Gulf Mutual Co-operation And Planned Development: 
At the regional level the process of co-operation 
is influenced by the geo-strategic location of the 
region, its distinctiveness and proximity among the 
regional states. Proximity does not mean in geographic 
term but it involves the pattern of interaction. It 
also depends upon the identity of perception and common 
interest, with regard to regional affairs. Further, the 
probability of forming a regional or sub-regional force 
existed. But it is regional conflict which has been the 
key factor in introducing the process of co-operation. 
The level of co-operation and co-ordination among 
the Arab Gulf states especially since 1970 has shown a 
marked advance over that which existed previously. Most 
notable has been the host of economic and social co-
operation and co-ordination agreements concluded among 
the states. The attempts aimed at enhancing co-
operation and co-ordination in these spheres may be 
divided into the following categories: 
1. Broad agreement laying down general principles 
for co-operation and co-ordination. 
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2. Agreements to pursue specific policies of co-
operation and co-ordination. 
3. Establishment of joint committees for 
considering and implementing agreed proposals 
of co-operation and co-ordination. 
4. Cultural and social co-operation. 
5. Collective needs of the Arab Gulf Sates. 
6. Joint Project . 
There were two sets of agreements on the general 
principles decided in the past two years. The first was 
in 1977 and was the product of the first general 
conference of Arab Gulf Trade ministers. All the seven 
Arab Gulf Sates (Bahrain, Iraq, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, 
Saudi Arabia and the UAE) were parties to the 
agreement, which sought to lay down a frame work within 
which co-operation among the Arab Gulf states should 
proceed. The main areas of co-operation were on the 
common market, that maximum security should be given to 
the states, that joint industrial, agricultural and 
commercial projects should be undertaken where 
1. Niblock, T., (ed.) Social And Economic Development 
in the Arab Gulf. Croom Helm, London, 1983, p.196. 
125 
possible, and that cooperation should be pursued in the 
fields of educational and scientific research . The 
second agreement consisted of those concluded between 
Kuwait and Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE and Oman in December 
1978. The agreements envisaged the unification of 
policies on customs and tariffs relating to the 
protection of local industries and the joint projects 
between Kuwait and the concerned countries. 
A series of agreements between Kuwait and Bahrain, 
Qatar and the UAE, all signed in June 1973, guaranteed 
the free movement of capital, labour and products 
between Kuwait and each of these countries. A measure 
of free trade was introduced between Saudi Arabia and 
Bahrain in April 1975, when these states agreed that 
most of the major products traded between them should 
be exempted from custom duties. In October 1978 Kuwait 
and Iraq agreed to exempt all goods traded between them 
from custom duties. 
There were joint committees to look after the 
cooperative relations between Arab Gulf states. Most of 
2. Sreedhar, The Gulf Scramble for Security. ABC Pub. 
House, New Delhi, 1983, p.120. 
126 
these joint committees were responsible to their 
respective governments for the cooperation and 
coordination measures which could be taken to encourage 
trade, areas of economic activity where joint projects 
could be undertaken etc, such joint committees were 
established between Bahrain and Qatar in November 1972, 
between Kuwait and Bahrain, Qatar and the UAE in June 
1973, and between Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, Kuwait, 
Qatar and the UAE in 1978. In 1977, Kuwait and Saudi 
Arabia formed a joint committee on industrial 
coordination in the fields of cement, glass and car 
tyre production. Besides these, there were also other 
committees to lookafter their joint projects within the 
Gulf^. 
Cultural cooperation, especially among the smaller 
Arab Gulf states has proceeded within the framework of 
cooperation agreements, covering the exchange of 
scholarship, television programmes and technical 
information. The cooperation agreement between the 
Kuwait and Bahrain, Qatar and the UAE in June 1973, 
3. Bhutani, S., "Gulf", Regional initiative to prevent 
Meddling, Main Stream. Delhi, 6 June,1981, p.25,26. 
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between Saudi Arabia and UAE in April 1975 all laid 
down a framework for such exchanges. The conference of 
Arab Gulf Education Ministers held in April 1978 ended 
an agreement that such goals and curricula should be 
standardised, all seven Gulf States were involved in 
A 
this agreement . 
JOINT PROJECTS: 
Although most of the joint committees on economic 
cooperation were instructed to examine the possibility 
of joint projects in different fields, the number of 
joint projects actually undertaken on a government to 
government basis, have been limited. One area in which 
joint projects have been carried through. The oil 
industry has however been outside the scope of the 
activities of these committees. In the latter industry, 
states have cooperated in the development of oil fields 
which stretches borders such as the Bunduq field 
between the UAE and Qatar, the Abu Sarafa field between 
Bahrain and Saudi Arabia and the oil fields of the 
4. Sandwick, J.A., The Gulf Cooperation Council. 
Modernization & Stability in the Interdependent 
World, Boulder, Westview Prss, 1987, pp.29-30. 
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5 
partitioned Zone between Kuwait and Saudi Arabia . 
Besides this oil sector, the main projects have 
been the joint cement venture between Saudi Arabia and 
Bahrain (in 1975 and agreed in Aug.1977) being set up 
in Hofuf with a 25 percent Bahraini contribution, and 
the joint Kuwaiti-Saudi Arabian project for the 
production of cement and clinker (in 1976). 
Petrochemical complex in Oman with Kuwaiti 
participation and an oil refinery in Ras-al-Khaimah 
also with Kuwaiti participation. There have been six 
organisations created jointly by Arab Gulf Sates for 
the facility needed by Arab Gulf Sates. The other three 
organisations have been established with Arab Gulf 
Sates as the major participants with an added element 
from outside the area . 
The first functional organisation to be 
established was Gulf Air, set up in March 1973 jointly 
by Bahrain, Oamn and the UAE. At a meeting in January 
1976 the Arab Gulf established a two functional 
5. Jha, A.N., India's Economic Diplomacy in the Gulf. 
ABC Pub. House, New Delhi, 1988, pp.55,56. 
6. Peterson, J.E., Defending Arabia. Croom Helm, 
London, 1986, pp.215-216. 
ns 
organisation, a shipping company and an international 
Bank, the former was formally initiated as the United 
Arab Shipping Company in May 1976, with the 
participation of Bahrain, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi 
Arabia and the UAE, the latter was set up in Bahrain 
with the participation of the same group of states in 
November 1976, as the Gulf International Bank. A 
meeting of Arab Gulf ministers of information also in 
January 1976 accepted a proposal from Kuwait for the 
establishment of an Arab Gulf News Agency under the 
joint scheme of Bahrain, Iraq, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, 
Saudi Arabia and the UAE. The remaining functional 
organisations the Gulf Ports Union, was established in 
October 1976 to coordinate handlings between the Ports 
of the seven Arab Gulf States . 
The functional organisatons within which Arab Gulf 
States play the dominant role, yet which also involve 
an element external to the Gulf are the Arab Petroleum 
Investment Company (in January 1975 jointly financed by 
Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE) the Gulf 
7. Jha, A. N.,GCC and the Gulf Security, Mainstream. 
Delhi, December, 1984, pp. 26-29. 
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organisation for the Development of Egypt ( in 1977, 
under the joint authority of Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi 
Arabia, the UAE and Egypt which was suspended since the 
Camp David Agreement ) and the Arab organisation for 
industrialisation (begining in 1977 under the joint 
authority of Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Egypt). 
The Gulf States also, of course, constitute the main 
part of the membership of OPEC, but Libya too is a 
member®. 
Though, geographically the region is a unity. The 
strategic political and economic significance of the 
region warrants a closer look at the area. So many 
factors among the traditional historical structure of 
the region have contributed to its political division. 
Not the least important of these is the close contacts 
with the west during the last two centuries, which has 
proved to be divisive in nature. Treaty of 1916 and the 
mandate system of the League of Nations have resulted 
in the creation of a number of new and often artificial 
states . 
8. Nugent, J.B., (ed.) Bahrain and the Gulf. Croom 
Helm, London, 1985, pp. 190-193. 
9. Lorenze.K.K., The Changing Pattern of Political 
Power in Iraq. 1958 to 1971, New York, 1972, p.8., 
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However, within the Gulf region the confrontation 
derive from the divergent ethno-religious substratum 
now supplemented by power rivalries and by territorial 
and other conflicts. The primary divergence here stems 
from the ancient hostility between the Aryan (Persian) 
and Semitic (Arab) ethnic groups, on the one hand and 
between the Shiite and Sunni sects of Islam on the 
other. The Arab states together do form a special group 
which is characterized by common historic, national 
religious and ethnic ties . In international political 
terms the Arab actors themselves are also clustered 
around a number of axes of conflict on the one hand and 
cooperation on the other. 
However, the most of these conflicts that exist in 
the region can be traced either to its intermixed 
history or to the policies of some external actors (the 
great powers) furthering their own interests. The 
history of the region has been one of mutual warfare 
consequently many a portion of territory has exchanged 
hands and have been ruled over by different powers at 
10. Singh, K.R., Conflict and cooperation in te Gulf, 
International Studies. New Delhi, Oct.-Dec. 1976, 
No-4, p.489. 
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different times. These controls exercised in the past 
have now been frequently quoted as arguments in support 
of claims over them. Iraq's claim (1961) to sovereignty 
over Kuwait and moreover the islands of Bubiyan and 
Warba belonging to the latter. The Iraqi invasion on 
Kuwait on 2nd August 1990, followed by annexation a 
week later, and then finally declaring Kuwait as her 
19th district on 29th August 1990, all are the 
manifestation of the same claim. Iran's claim to Abu 
Musa and the two Tumb islands belonging to Sharjah and 
Rasal-Khaimah which are parts of the UAE, its claim to 
the island of Bahrain, its dispute with Saudi Arabia 
over the islands of Al-Farsi and Al-Arabi, and 
Bahrain's claim to Zubrah in Qatar are disputes in 
point. The creation of Iraq in 1920 which, on the one 
hand, gave rise to the Kurdish problem within it, on 
the other hand, initiated its conflict with Iran over 
Shatt-al-Arab and with Saudi Arabia over the 
demarcation df its frontiers, is a glaring example of 
this. A new dimension to the conflicts in the region 
has been added by an increasing exploration for oil in 
the continental shelf. The delimitation of the 
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continental shelf boundaries in the Gulf has now become 
a problem not only because of the geographical 
difficulties but also because of the economic status 
involved . 
It thus become evident that the conflicts which 
surround the Gulf region indeed varied and convey the 
impression of the existence of a "Real Gulf" within the 
Gulf region. Most of these conflicts moreover are 
highly complex and abound in historical, legal and 
political arguments. 
CO-OPERATION 
Among the disputes that have resulted in 'the 
Bahrain question' which had assumed importance in the 
1950's, when Iran on historical ground staked its claim 
to it. The issue remained a very sensitive one for 
nearly two decades and was finally settled through the 
good offices of UNO. Only in May 1970, after a UN 
commission recommended its independence. Iran had 
earlier agreed to Bahrain's proposal that the wishes of 
11. Aitchison, C.U., A Collection of Treaties, etc. 
Relating to India And Neighbouring Countries, 
Delhi, 1933, p.p. 242-253. 
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the people of Bahrain be assertained to decide the 
future of the island. The UN Security Council, on 11 
May 1970 passed a resolution suggesting Bahrain to 
become an independent State. Iran accepted this 
1 2 
resolution and gave up its claim to Bahrain . 
Another major dispute in the region that was 
pending solution was the one over the Buraimi Oasis 
extending over 30000 sq.miles and lying at the 
frontiers between Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Abu Dhabi and 
Oman. Although the dispute could be traced back to the 
1930s, it assumed greater proportions only because of 
its potential oil reserves. A Solution to this 
sensitive problem was reached in July 1974 during the 
visit of Prince Fahd, the minister of the Interior of 
Saudi Arabia to Abu Dhabi. Later on 21st August 1974, 
King Faisal of Saudi Arabia and Sheikh Zayed of Abu 
Dhabi and President of UAE, arrived at an understanding 
on resolving the dispute. The former agreed to a status 
quo in Buraimi in exchange for a corridor to the Gulf 
and a triangular strip of land on Abu Dhabi's eastern 
12. Singh, K.R., op.cit., p.496. 
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border near Qatar^^. The successful delimitation of the 
Neutral Zone between Iraq and Saudi Arabia through an 
agreement reached on July 2, 1975 has settled another 
significant dispute of the region. By this agreement 
the two neighbours have agreed to share the zone 
equally. 
The most dramatic and the most significant 
development in the Gulf area was signalled by the 
sudden agreement signed at Algiers on March 6, 1975, 
settling the long standing disputes between Iran and 
Iraq over the Shatt-al-Arab, the frontier problem and 
the Kurdish problem. The late Shah of Iran and Saddam 
Hussain, then Deputy Chairman of the Revolutionary 
Command Council of Iraq, agreed to demarcate their 
borders on the principles of the constantinopole 
agreement of 1913 and to demarcate the Shatt-al-Arab 
frontier according to the median line of the navigation 
channel (the so called Thalweg). Thus Iraq gave up its 
insistence on the acceptance of the 1937 treaty between 
them. They also agreed to end subversive activities 
13. Ference, .A., Politics of the Indian Ocean Region. 
New York, 1976, p.p.116-17. 
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along their boundaries. The latter promise implied the 
14 
cessation of aid to the Kurds by Iran . The relaxation 
of tension and the shift from the earlier policy of 
confrontation made a qualitative change in the relation 
between Iran and Iraq, and a new spirit of co-operation 
animated their bilateral relations. 
The delimitation of the continental shelf 
boundaries was another major source of conflicts in the 
Gulf. Despite the difficulties involved, about seven 
continental shelf agreements have so far been signed 
between the various states in the Gulf. The agreement 
by Saudi Arabia with Bahrain had been signed as early 
as 1958 and its negotiations with Iran had started 
early in the 1960's. An agreement, however, was reached 
on 24 October 1968 when the dispute over the islands of 
Al-Arabi and Al-Farasi was solved, the former going to 
Saudi Arabia and the latter to Iran. Agreements over 
the continental shelf were also reached between Abu 
Dhabi and Qatar in March 1969, between Iran and Qatar 
in September 1969, between Iran and Bahrain in June 
14. 1bid-D.116 
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1967 and between Iran and UAE in August 1974^^. The 
last of these was an achievement in so far as it 
signalled an agreement by the two powers on the 
question of jurisdiction over Abu Dhabi and the two 
Tumb islands. 
Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC): 
After facing the threats from many corners, the 
Gulf States formed the Gulf Co-operation Council in 
March 1981 to strengthen their defence from any 
external aggression or any attempts at destabilisation 
from inside. GCC is a regional organisation of the 
Gulf States. The six countries of the Gulf region, 
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, Oman, Bahrain and the 
United Arab Emirates are its members. 
The origin of the GCC may be attributed to the 
destabilizing events that took place in the Gulf region 
during 1979 and 1980. The Shia revolution in Iran with 
its emphasis on religious expansionism in the direction 
of the Gulf endangered the internal stability of the 
states of this region. The Soviet armed intervention in 
15. Singh, K.R., Op.Cit.p.97, 
13S 
Afghanistan not only brought the foreign troops at 
their door steps but also enhanced the possibility of 
the super power confrontation in the Gulf region. The 
Iran-Iraq war by turning the entire Gulf into the 
theatre of war created unfavourable condition for the 
oil shipments through the Strait of Hormuz. The GCC is 
an outcome of the Gulf States, awareness to the danger 
coming to their security and oil interests. It aims at 
safeguarding the both. The basic purpose of the GCC as 
16 
specified in Article 4 of its charter are : 
1. to achieve co-ordination and co-operation among 
the member states in all fields as a prelude 
for unity, 
2. to strengthen the ties, contacts and facts of 
co-operation among the people of the member 
states in different fields, 
3. to establish similar procedures and practices 
among the member states in fields of finance 
and economies, social welfare and health, 
education and culture, commerce, customs and 
16. Jha, A.N., op.cit., p.51. 
13^ 
communications, information, tourism and public 
administraion, 
4. to support scientific and technological 
progress in the fields of agriculture, mining, 
industry, marine and animal resources, and to 
encourage the co-operation of the private 
sector for the good of the people of the member 
countries . 
Economic Development Programmes: 
The economic programmes and functions of the GCC 
are very impressive and in this connection, the 
"Economic Agreement" is the GCC's most important 
achievement. It is embodied in a comprehensive document 
which details the mechanism, framework and principles 
of co-ordination and integration of economic activity 
in the whole region. It consists of seven parts and 28 
articles the major elements of which are as follows: 
(i) a free trade area in the region with no tariff, 
on regional products and a common tariff on non 
regional outputs. 
17. Mustafa, G., Gulf Co-operation Council, ORBISS 
Journal. Dacumented, Vol.4, No.1,1982, p.p.61-54. 
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(ii) a pooling of bargaining power when dealing with 
trading partners outside the region, 
(iii) a common oil policy and a coordinated policy of 
industrialization based on oil resources, 
(iv) a co-ordinated industrial development policy 
for the region as a whole, 
(v) special emphasis on establishing and promoting 
joint projects in all sectors with the aim of 
tying the production, chains of the region into 
a common development sequence, 
(vi) Co-operation in the field of local technology 
and the joint acquisition of foreign 
technology, 
(vii) pooling of human resources to prevent harmful 
competition for scarce labour, 
(viii) linking the regional market through road, rail, 
air and water transport networks, 
(ix) a common legal framework for trade and 
investment in the region, 
(x) a common development add policy and, 
(xi) a common market area in which citizens of the 
council member countries are free to move, 
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work, own, inherit and bequest within each and 
18 
every country of the council . 
Since the primary objective of the GCC, as 
claimed by the member states, is to expand economic co-
operation among them, various steps have been taken 
since its inception to co-ordinate their economic 
policies. Decisions were taken to co-ordinate in all 
spheres of economic activity including drilling, 
refinery, marketing and pricing of oil as well as 
transporting and exploring natural gas and developing 
sources of energy. In the field of trade and commerce, 
a collective co-operation pact has been signed aiming 
at abolishing all trade and custom barriers and 
unifying financing and banking regulations and 
encouraging capital investment in member states. 
The third GCC summit held at Manama (Bahrain) in 
November 1982, decided to convert the bilateral 
agreements into multilateral ones and it also approved 
the establishment of a $3-6 billion Gulf Investment 
Authority for expanding investment in member states, 
18. Kubursi, A.A., Oil. Industrialization And 
Development In The Arab Gulf States. Croom Helm, 
London, 1984, pp.4-6. 
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and the conversation of the Saudi Arab Foundation for 
specifications and measures into an establishment to 
cover all six GCC states. Moreover, the oil ministers 
decided to build a huge petrochemical complex in Oman 
and set up a pipeline for transporting the crude from 
the UAE to Oman as an alternative to the vulnerable sea 
19 
route through the Strait of Hormuz . 
In the fourth annual summit conference of the GCC 
Supreme Council in Nov. 1983, the General Secretary Mr. 
Abdullah Bishara recommended extending scope of the 
joint economic agreement to include tourism, 
maintenance, craft industries and many others. The 
report also suggested the unification of utility 
charges such as water, power, communications and gas 
for the member states. 
Mr. Bishara gave the details which included 
interalia projects on (a) the location of strategic 
food resources (b) a joint agricultural policy, (c) the 
establishment of a network of gas pipelines linking the 
gas fields for industrial countries and (d) setting up 
19. Jha, A.N., op.cit.,p.55. 
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of a maritime company for transport between GCC ports 
and the study for a railjvay network connecting them 
which would eventually link the GCC states with 
Europe . 
In the field of health and medical care, a joint 
Arab committee for drugs and pharmaceuticals has been 
set up to coordinate the policy of using drugs in the 
hospitals and regulations governing the "United 
Registration System" for companies producing drugs and 
21 
other related products 
Recently, the establishment of a joint 
organisation to develop the steel industry in seven 
Gulf States has been proposed by the Gulf Organisation 
for Industrial Consultation (GOIC). The plant to be 
completed by 2000 AD would involve 35000 workers 
ensuring a healthy growth of industry with rapid 
increase in demand for st6|el in the GCC States and 
Iraq. Moreover, there are several steel projects under 
construction in Oman, Bahrailn, the UAE and Kuwait. The 
20. Beblawi, H., The Arab Gulf Economy in a Turbulent 
Age. Croom Helm, London, 1984, pp. 143-45. 
21. Arabia, The Islamic World Review. London, No. 32, 
April 1984, p.26. 
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GCC States have also agreed to draw up a new food 
strategy and set up regional food stock piling centres, 
feeding the 14 million over all population over the 
next two decades by taking measures to avoid food price 
fluctuations, interrupt imports and supply shortages 
experienced by food exporting countries. 
Defence And Security of the Gulf Through GCC: 
Defence and security of the Gulf and protection of 
oil fields and other important installations have been 
the prime motive behind the establishment of the GCC. 
The Gulf States have been emphasizing that "the 
security of the Gulf comes from itself and depends on 
22 
its own capabilities and its own people . The GCC 
communique emphasized;" The council reflects the 
determination of these states and their rights of 
defend their security and preserve their interest. 
In fact, apart from a genuine desire to adopt a 
non-aligned strategy for the Gulf, the GCC countries 
efforts to distance themselves from the West, At the 
time of its formation, it was affirmed that the 
22. ibid,p.p.26-28. 
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formation of GCC was neither meant as a pro-west bloc, 
hostile to the Soviet Unions, nor as an Arab grouping 
against non-Arab States. It was declared that the GCC's 
efforts were directed against the hostility of both the 
super-powers and towards furthering the cause of Arab 
Unity^^. 
For collective defence of the region,the Gulf 
States have agreed to create a "Gulf Rapid Deployment 
Force" and a common air defence system incorporating 
Airborne Warning and Controlling System (AWACS) plans 
of Saudi Arabia procured from the U.S. Moreover, in 
order to achieve self-reliance in arms production, 
these states have also agreed to set up a $ 8 billion^ 
arms industry. However, despite their desire of 
maintaining a clear distance from the super-powers, 
there is a discrepancy in the approach of the member 
states. 
In reality, every member state has its own 
compulsions and constraints, while adopting a course of 
actions or formulation facilities in a given situation. 
Most of the GCC states have been directly or indirectly 
23. Ibid, p.912. 
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linked with the United States. For example, Bahrain had 
an executive agreement with the U.S. through which the 
U.S. naval vessels enjoyed access to its port and 
support in Bahrain. Although the facilities were vastly 
reduced in 1977, but the US Navy continued to have some 
facilities. Oman has been openly favouring the US 
presence in the region for its defence and economic 
reasons. But the Kuwait has been the only GCC 
member, which has kept itself away from the super 
powers. Though the Kuwait has diplomatic relations with 
24. 
the USSR since 1963 and has good ties with the US . 
Kuwait has been urging the other GCC members to 
establish relations with the USSR to demonstrate their 
determination to avoid identification with or 
dependence on the west. 
However, in the prevailing atmosphere of tensions, 
rivalries and helplessness, resulting from the 
consecutive frustrations in each abortive unifying 
attempt, the GCC has emerged and created an important 
movement in the direction of forging 
24. Ali, S., Moscow Widens the Gulf. Far Eastern 
Economic Review. Hong Kong, Nov. 1981, p.p. 28-29. 
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cooperation and unity among the Gulf States. It has 
made sufficient progress in initiating cooperation in 
economic programmes and coordination in political 
fields. 
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CHAPTER -VI 
Iran's Revolution & Gulf Responses: 
It is a well known 
fact that no-regime could be kept secure and stable by 
any kind of sophisticated weapons system of whatever 
size if it did not have a popular base. In the 
formative phase of the revolution, a variety of 
economic, social, political, administrative and 
religious factors combined to build up a mass movement 
which overthrew the monarchical system. In this 
revolution there were some important issues of broad 
nature such as autocratic rule, equitable distribution 
of national wealth and observance of basic human 
rights and granting liberties. This revolution had a 
clear religious orientation, There were some aspects 
which were having direct concern to Iran's neighbours. 
Primarily a domestic issue, breaking out again the 
autonomy demand by the kurds in Azerbaijan and the 
Arabs in Khuzistan had extra territorial overtones, and 
it was of interest to the Arabs Secondly, the official 
pronouncements made first by Prime Minister Shapour 
Bakhtiar that Iran would no more act as the policeman 
^. yj \r 
of the region . This statement indicated a new 
orientation in Iran and tended to disturb the whole 
power-equilibirium, which was not merely a local 
phenomenon. From this angle two interactive 
2 
developments constantly permeated the Arab perception . 
These were the Egyption-Israeli rapprochement leading 
to the condition of the camp David Agreements. Second 
was the understanding between the provisional 
Government of Iran and the P.L.O. One was a deliberate 
move, the other came as the out- burst. One created 
fresh rifts among the Arabs, the other brought the 
Arabs and the Iranian emotionally closer. 
Early pronouncements by the Iranian leaders as 
regards their abandonment of the role of the policeman 
on behalf of the United States, the termination of 
Iran's relation with Israel, and the Iranian 
association (with the Palestinians as brothers,made a 
deep impact on the Arabs in general and on the 
Palestinians in particular. They were particularly 
1. Bhutani, S.(ed.), Contemporary Gu1f. Academic 
Press, New Delhi, 1980, p.p.20-21. 
2. ibid, p.21. 
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crucial for the Gulf. Where the Palestinians came to 
3 
occupy a considerably influential position . 
The Gulf responses towards the Iranian Revolution 
may be categorised at two levels, firstly the official 
and popular, and in the second case before and after 
the revolution. The pre-revolutionary upsurge which had 
paralysed the Iranians' life and state administration 
in which the monarchy came increasingly under attack 
was that the all Arab Governments not only viewed the 
political events unfolding in Iran but definitely sided 
with the Shah's regime. Secondly some of the main 
points of contention in Iran existed in most of the 
Arab States as well. They, therefore, expressed their 
unqualified support for the Shah and hoped that he 
would be able to control and contain the situation. 
(But the Kuwait saved herself from the revolution and 
Iraq also ). 
The leader of the Islamic Revolution, Ayatullah 
Khomeini, had been living for some years in Iraq. But 
3. Cooley, J.K., Iran, the Palestinians and the Gulf, 
Journal of Foreign Affairs. Summer, 1979, p.1017, 
4. Bhutani, S., op.cit.p.23. 
15, / 
in September 1978 when he intensified his anti-Shah 
activities and called for a people's revolt and for 
the setting up of an Islamic Government in Iran. The 
Shah requested Iraq to expel Khomeini form her 
territory. Similary the other Gulf States also declined 
to accomodate Khomeini inspite of their frequent 
protestations of Pan-Islamic Unity and Solidarity. The 
reason was clear because Khomeini symbolised an anti 
establishment movement and was also projected as the 
5 
leader of a Shnte resurgence . Moreover, the Arab 
assessment of the Iranian Revolution was that it might 
have wider repercussions in the region. When the 
pressure on the Shah's Government intensified and 
rumours about his exit from Iran spread far and wide 
and widened the prospects of success of the revolution. 
This naturally alarmed the Arab regimes of the Gulf. 
Kuwait being close to the Iranian border took the 
initiative in responding to the situation by sending 
crown Prince and Prime Minister Shaikh Saad Abdullah 
Salem al Sabah to the sister Gulf States to apprise 
them of the dangerous potentialities of the situation 
5. Cooley, J.K., op.cit., pp.385-86. 
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and to stress the need to consolidate their Politico-
Economic Co-operation. Beside this, several official 
meetings took place among the leaders of the Gulf 
States. The first meeting was called by the UAE on 8th 
June 1979 to study the repercussions of the 
developments in Iran. Similarly on 6th Jan, 1979 crown 
Prince Fahd in an interview "not only provided a reason 
for Saudi support for the Shah but also warned that the 
continuing turmoil in Iran would not help stability in 
the Middle East". Saudi position appeared equivocal 
when the Shah left Iran. The third reaction was that 
the Kuwait's Minister of States for cabinet affairs, 
Abdul Aziz Hussein reaffirmed on 29th Jan,1979 his 
Government's stand of rejection of any foreign 
interference in any form in the Gulf region and its 
opposition to any move designed to bring the region 
into the strategic defence area of any country or any 
intervention of the super powers in the region . 
However, the second phase of the Gulf responses 
started with the period when revolution in Iran became 
6. Peterson, J.E., Defending Arabia. Croom Helm, 
London, 1986, pp.213-15. 
^ ' Ot 
an accomplished fact. The new situation in Iran had 
some vital international implications, two of which 
immediately affected the Arabs. The primary change in 
Iran was the Islamic orientation of the new Government. 
The main fear for the Gulf states was that the Iranian 
revolution may encourage, the shiite community in the 
Gulf countries because almost all the Gulf states have 
sufficient Shiite population. And the second factor 
causing psychological destability was the new regime's 
embryonic foreign policy. Few weeks later the foreign 
Minister Prince Saud-al-Faisal made it clear that 
Kingdom did not like worsening of internal condition to 
such a level that would threat foreign intervention. 
Shahpour Bakhtiar was averse to the role of Policeman 
of the Gulf. He also rejected Iran's alignments in the 
various international collective Security pacts. As a 
matter of fact the fall of the Shah's regime was a 
severe setback for U.S. influence in Iran. Another 
dimension of the new situation was the revival of the 
autonomy movement by the ethnic linguistic minorities 
of Iran, especially the Kurds and the Arabs. These 
developments did not only increase domestic tension but 
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also attracted foreign, particularly Arab attention. 
The Arab Governments engaged themselves in a 
reassessment of Iran's attitude towards the Gulf. The 
new regime in Iran embarked upon evolving a cogent 
policy towards the Gulf regime. It was based on a set 
of principles such as Islamic brotherhood, peaceful 
co-existence and non-interference in internal affairs 
and mutual respect for territorial integrity. However, 
there were contradictions in declared policy and 
practice which created problems for the Prime Minister 
Mehdi Bazargan . 
Amir Abbas Entezam, Deputy Prime Minister for 
Administration and Public Affairs and spokesman of the 
Government of Iran claimed in an interview on 22 March, 
1979 that his country was seeking to consolidate its 
relations with the Gulf Countries. He stressed Iran's 
desire to establish relation based on Islamic brother 
hood, good neighbourliness and respect for national 
Q 
interest . The two Iranian religious leader made 
7. Fischer, M. M. J., Iran From Religious Dispute to 
Revolution. Cambridge, London, 1980, pp.210-11. 
8. Bhutani, S., op.cit., p.26. 
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statements which were added to the sourness in Arab 
Iranian relations, Ayatullah Sadegh Khalkhali stated at 
a press conference in Dubai that the Persian Gulf 
should be renamed Islamic Gulf in order to reflect the 
religion as against its ethenic make up. Another 
Ayatullah Sadegh Rouhani stated that in view of the 
recent demand for the return of the three islands to 
Arab sovereignty, he asserted that the three islands 
had been part of the Persian Empire and he 
added,"Bahrain remains Iran's 14th province until its 
position is clarified by the national Assembly. 
However, this was opposed by Mohsen Pezeshkpour a 
former member of Majlis and said that Iran's claim on 
g 
Bahrain was illegal and invalid . 
Later on Rouhan's assertion about Bahrain was 
disclaimed officially. Iran also said that, this was 
Rouhan's personal opinion not the Government policy . 
The Iran's role as policeman has terminated and 
the new government disengaged itself militarily from 
Oman, According to the Yusuf -al-Alavi, Secretary in 
9. ibid, p.27. 
10. Fischer , M. M. J., op.cit., pp.181-84 
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the Foreign ministry of Oman that contacts had been 
established with the new government in Iran for 
complete withdrawal of Iranian troops from Dhofar 
(Oman). The withdrawal of Iranian troops from Dhofar 
gave encouragement to the popular Front for the 
Liberation of Oman (PFLO). Then a PFLO delegation went 
to Iran and held discussion with Ayatullah Khomeini and 
with the government officials, but nothing could be 
came out from that contact and visit . 
Such implications realized by the Oman and adopted 
a conciliatory posture towards new Iran. The Oman's 
Ambassador in Iran said that his government had 
refrained from lodging a protest against the visit of 
the PFLO delegation. He stressed that the people of the 
Gulf were all Muslims, that they took pride to the 
Islamic Revolution of Iran, that the government of 
Oman hoped to expand its ties with Iran, and that 
there was great room for the expansion of cooperation 
among all the littoral states of the Gulf. Later on 
Iran assured Oman that it would not support the 
11. Bhutani, S., op.cit.,p.28. 
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Marxist oriented PFLO. It also pledged economic aid to 
19 
Oman . 
However; Iraq's perceptions of Revolutionary Iran 
were quite different. Iraq looked at the developments 
in Iran from a wholly different series of angles. 
Geographical location, bilateral relations, ideological 
orientation and power ambitions. These variables 
precipitated a delicate situation which called for 
careful handling by both sides. But in the midst of the 
emotional outburst, both sides lost mutual trust and 
confidence and generated much heat in the summer of 
1979. These two countries entertained a number of 
grievances against each other. The Iranians remembered 
that the Iraqi rulers had obliged the ex-Shah's request 
. 13 
to expel Khomeini . 
But the Iranian-Iraqi understanding was disturbed 
partly by propaganda on both sides and partly by 
certain developments in the two countries. Events like 
the reemergence of the autonomy movements of the Kurds 
and the Arabs in Iran and the tightening of control 
12. ibid, p.29. 
13. Baghdad Observer. 13 February, 1979. 
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over Shiite elements and centres in Iraq had inter-
states implications. The situation soon degenerated 
into insurgency in northern and southern Iran. The 
activities of Kurds alarmed both Baghdad and Tehran. 
The problem was complex as the Kurdish autonomists 
were not confined to Iran alone. The breakdown of the 
military in the border areas permitted free movement 
and smuggling of arms across the international border 
on either side. This resulted into deliberate 
14-
provocations by the two countries against each other . 
The out breaks of violence in Khorramshahr and other 
places in the south were interpreted in Tehran as 
secessionist moves instigated by the Arab Governments 
of the Gulf. Events moved faster in May and June. The 
worst provocation in Iranian eyes was the Iraqi 
Government's crackdown on the Shiite strong holds in 
Najaf and Kerbala in the middle of June. Tension 
reached the boiling point when Iraqi planes bombed 
Kurdish positions well inside Iranian territory. The 
reason was that the Iraqi action was to cause a strain 
14. Bhutani S., op.cit., pp.30-31. 
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in Iran's relations with the other littoral states of 
the Gulf^^. 
However, the situation of conflict between Iran 
and Iraq, put the other Arab states in the region in a 
state of dilemma. The perceptions of these states 
differed from those of Iraq. The main variables in 
their national interest were: 
(1) regime security, 
(2) fear of radicalism, 
(3) soft corner for the west and 
(4) apprehension about Soviet expansionism. 
Previously, in the wake of the fall of the Shah, 
they appeared to be as watchful of the revolutionary 
regime in Iran as they were of the Baathist Government 
in Iraq. The apparent difference between the two was 
that while the government in Baghdad was ideologically 
socialist oriented and the government in Tehran was 
still at an embryonic position. And the dimensions of 
both were different. Even though the new Iranian 
Government declared its objective to be independent of 
15. Zabih, S., The Left in Contemporary Iran. Croom 
Helm, London, 1986, p.p. 62-63. 
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both the U.S. and the Soviet Union, its Islamic 
16 
Orientation tilted it to an anti communist position . 
Iran's break with Israel and its open support for 
the Palestinians made a tremendous imapct and won many 
friends for it among the Arabs.In this context,the 
presence of Palestinians in considerable numbers and 
their occupying some important positions, even in the 
armed forces in the Gulf States had a great influence 
on the attitude of the Arabs. 
Though the Arabs of the gulf were sympathetically 
inclined to the demand for autonomy made by the 
minorities in Iran, they expressed their support on the 
basis of national, political, and religious grounds and 
refrained from introducing the Shia-Sunni angle. Yet at 
times,a suggestion to organize the situation of Muslim 
minorities and eliminate oppression among them was 
made. As regards the post-revolutionary Iran, the 
broad attitude in the lower Gulf States seemed to be 
that once the Arabs had recognized the right of the 
Iranian people to reorganize their Society on the basis 
16. Bhutani, S., op.cit., p.34. 
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of Islamic values any tension between the two peoples 
was unjustified . After the establishment of Islamic 
Republic in Iran a new wave had come in Iran's 
relations with other Gulf countries. This was mainly 
in the field of oil. In the meeting of the organization 
of Petroleum-Exporting countries (OPEC) held in the 
month of June 1979, Iran expressed its desire to a 
closer coordination with the Arabs. Kuwait came 
closest, as it was affirmed by oil minister of Kuwait 
who said that relations between Iran and Kuwait were 
18 
good and would continue to be good and strong . The 
Kuwaiti foreign Minister Sheikh Sabah-al-Ahmad Jabar 
as-Sabah during a visit to Iran in July 1979, (which 
was the highest level visit till then from any Gulf 
country to post Revolutionary Iran) said that "The 
Iranian Revolution had strengthened the position of the 
Arabs. It was only now that Iran could be cosidered an 
Islamic brother and a true friend of the Arab world". 
17. i b i d , p .35. 
18. i b i d , p. 35. 
19. i b i d , p .36. 
1^3 
Security of the Gulf After the Iranian Revolution: 
From the angle of extra territorial interest of 
the Western Powers particularly the United States and 
in terms of power configuration, the fall of the Shah 
in Iran was a serious setback not only in Iran but also 
in the region. The revolution in Iran and its 
aftermath were described as constituting a crisis. As 
in earlier revolutions, the situation was interpreted 
as one of a power-vacuum which must be filled by one of 
the two Super Powers. In other words the problem of 
security was a non-issue but security was presupposed a 
20 
threat of invasion by the super-powers . 
The Islamic Orientation of the Iranian Republic 
and Khomeini's. Ideas about socio-political 
reorganization created a fresh polarization in the 
regime. In this respect the Arab regimes confronted a 
menace which was likely to emanate from domestic 
situations. It politicized Islam which posed a 
challenge to the Gulf Government. It was these regimes 
which had to face with the problem of security. The 
20. Hero, D., Iran. Under the Avatullahs. Routledge and 
Kejan Paul, London, 1987, p.p. 105-6. 
IS4 
problem arose because Iran under the Shah was a pillar 
of the U.S. influence. However, the leaders of the 
Revolution declared their intention to terminate Iran's 
role as a policeman and also terminated U.S. influence. 
But the Government of a state like Oman felt nervous 
because it was dependent on the Iranian troops for its 
security. The Oman's perception was mainly 
concentrated on the internal insurgency which enjoyed 
the support of the peoples Democratic Republic of Yemen 
(PDRY) which had relations with the Soviet Union. When 
that relationship was disrupted, some Arab Governments 
started feeling concerned about their own security. In 
order to neutralize the pressure of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran the lower Gulf regimes began to pay 
heed to Islamic solidarity. However^to meet the new 
developments some Arab Governments proposed some sort 
of collective grouping. Their reasons pre-supposed a 
threat in terms of the designs of the super-powers. 
Gulf States were confronted with the problem of 
reconciling their Arab Nationalism with Pan-Islamism 
and also of justifying their friendship with the 
western powers. There thus ensued an interesting 
ISD 
interaction between the regime security interests of 
the Gulf Governments, Islamic resurgence in Iran, aid 
21 
the over all interests of the U.S. . 
So far the U.S. had adopted a two pillar policy by 
depending on Iran and Saudi Arabia as the protectors of 
its interests. This scheme was jeopardized by the 
developments in Iran as well by the new turn in the 
relations between Egypt and Israel. Later on there was 
a meeting held at Asir in South West Arabia. At the 
invitation of king Khaled, the Heads of State of 
Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar and the UAE attended this 
meeting. Its primary objective was to discuss the 
strategy needed for united co-operation and co-
ordination to face the challenge before the Arab 
nations. The UAE President Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan, who 
had been advocating regional co-operation, stated that 
such meetings would lead to our regional welfare, 
security and stability. In this meeting Oman and Iraq 
were not invited. This meeting had also discussed the 
ways and means of confronting the threat posed by the 
PDRY. Iran the cause for the latest build up of the 
21. Bhutani, S., op.cit., p.37. 
1S6 
Super-Powers in the region, while watching out for 
possible action against its revolutionary Government, 
turned its attention inwards. It got busy reinforcing 
its armed forces on defensive basis. The' Iranian 
government gave clear indication that it wanted the 
Gulf region to be made a zone of peace free from the 
influence of the Big Powers. The Commander-in-Chief of 
the Iranian Navy,Rear Admiral Ahmad Madani has said 
that Iran's policy towards the Gulf was to protect its 
own territorial integerity and influence as well as the 
sovereignty of its neighbours and in this respect 
Iran's position was identical with the other Gulf 
States . 
Later on, the foreign Minister of Qatar, Ahmad bin 
Saif-ath-Thani, said that co-ordination among the Gulf 
States was a practical answer to the political vacuum 
in the area. Though the UAE President Sheikh Zayed bin 
Sultan an-Nahiyan did not see a power vacuum in the 
area. Sheikh Mohd. bin Mubarak al-Khalifa, the Foreign 
Minister of Bahrain said that the people of the Gulf 
rejected all these suggestions that, there is a power 
22. Peterson, J. E., op.cit., pp.145-47. 
1S7 
vacuum in the region and they were capable of filling 
any vacuum through regional cooperation. The Saudi 
minister also said the same on 19th June 1979 that there 
23 
was no gap in security in the Gulf region . 
However, the thrust of these four representatives' 
views, though different from the US stand point, was 
that they all followed up their arguments with a 
suggestion for a joint responsibility by local states 
for the Gulf security. Knowingly the Pro U.S. activities 
of these states, it could be concluded that their 
rejection of the 'vacuum theory' was a public expression 
to meet the objections of the nationalist, with the U.S. 
role in the Egyptian-Israeli rapproachment, such a 
posture was expected to build up their independent 
image and draw Iran into the fold. Iran was not 
altogether adverse to a regional defence pact. Of the 
two super powers, the U.S. is in a better position to 
meet this Iranian condition and yet exercise its remote 
control. At this point though, the Iranian Government 
wounded up its connections with the 
23. Bhutani, S., op.cit., pp.39-40. 
1S8 
Central Treaty Organization^*, *CENTO while the CENTO 
has lost its validity, the bilateral pact with the U.S. 
continues to be crucial. The persistance with which the 
lower Gulf States have pursued their proposals for 
closer co-ordination, even in the name of Islam,does not 
seem to be void of effect as is suggested by Saudi 
Foreign Minister, visiting Iran and the Iranian Foreign 
Minister going to the Gulf capitals, for the purpose of 
exploring the prospect of expanding the area of Arab-
Iranian Co-operation. 
4c 
CENTO. It was on 24th Feb., 1955 that an agreement 
was signed by Turkey and Iraq for mutual defence later 
on U.K., Pakistan and Iran joined this organization, 
this was known as Baghdad Pact. The USA had became the 
full memebr of its major committees. In 1958 entered 
into agreements with the Baghdad Pact countries. In 
March 1959 at Ankara, USA signed bilateral agreements 
with Turkey, Iran and Pakistan, some year when Iraq 
withdrew from the Pact, the headquarters were 
transferred from Baghdad to Ankara.In 1959 the Baghdad 
Pact was changed into Central Treaty Organization CENTO. 
Since it is mainly related to mutual defence & co-
operation, the member parties under this pact, agreed to 
co-operate in security and defence measures and pledge 
to refrain from intervening in each other's internal 
affairs. They agreed to settle their disputes through UN 
Charter. This agreement was to remain valid for five 
years but renewable for next five years period. 
24. ibid, pp.40-41. 
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CHAPTER - VII 
Iran-Irag Relations: (i) During the Shah's days, 
(ii) Impact of the Revolution on 
Iran-Iraq Relations, 
(iii) War and the Negotiation. 
A trace of tension was noticeable in Iran-Iraq 
relationship during 1968. Some were the matters of a 
long history, like the issue of navigation in the 
Shatt-al-Arab water-way or the demarcation of the 
continental shelf while some are the results of the 
mistrust of the two regimes of a different nature. The 
ethnic animosity between Persians and Arabs and between 
Sunnis and Shias has never really disappeared. In the 
case of Middle East, while the Persians and the Arabs 
are separated by the Persian-Arab gulf, animosity shows 
clearly along the boundaries. Thus the question of a 
common border between the Arabic Iraq and the Persian 
Iran became a conflict for a long time. During this 
long period each claimed that the land of another side 
belonged to her. The Shatt-al-Arab, the river along 
which the border in question exists has economic and 
strategic importance for both sides, thus makes the 
171 
case more serious . Furthermore Iran also claimed the 
possession of Arabistan (West of Iran) and Khuzistan 
(North of Iran), different ideological orientations 
also became the cause of the dispute. 
Ethnic And Sectarian Animosity: 
Iran and Iraq share a common border (507 miles) 
and both have an outlet in the Gulf. They also share 
some of the old ethnic tribes (Kurds) and sectarian 
groupings which have often worked as a source of 
tension in their relations. The northern Iraq-Mosul-
Kirkuk-Khanaqin line has a sizable population (about 2 
million) of a mountainous tribe-Kurds, which has closer 
ethnic, cultural and religious ties with the Kurds on 
the Iranian side inhabited in Hamadan-Lake Rezaiyah-
2 
Maku line in the east . 
The province of Iran-Khuzistan in the South West 
is inhabited by the people of Arab origin, which have 
ethnic and cultural affinity with the people across the 
border. The province had been under a defacto control 
1. Kheli, S.T., (ed.), The Iran-Iraq War. Preager, 
U.S.A., 1983, pp.12-13. 
2. Europa, The Middle East and North Africa. 
1976.pp.383-84 
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of an Arab Sheikh Khazal of Muhammarah (Khurramshahar). 
In 1910, the British negotiated a treaty with the 
Sheikh for the oil exploration. With Reza Shah's 
comming to power in 1925 this treaty came to an end and 
the province fell to the control of Government of 
Iran. The Arabs call it Arabistan. With the rise of 
nationalism, a movement to recapture the province was 
launched by the nationalists in the fifties . Iraq at 
that time being under the rule of Pro-British monarchy 
did not play any role in this movement. But after the 
revolution of 1958 the regime of Maj. A.K. Kasim took 
considerable interest in this matter actively supported 
the liberation of Khuzistan from the Iran control. The 
other cause of the tension between the two states in 
the Sectarian Islamic groupings. Iraq has 53% Shias but 
ruled by a Sunni government. Shi a majority has often 
resented it. The Sectarian conflict which is inherent 
in the Iraqi System has assumed significant proportion 
after the Baath Party's comming into power in 1968, 
decided to oblige the Shah of Iran on whose request 
3. Asopa, S.K., Oil. Arms and Islam in the Gulf. 
Printwell Pub,, Jaipur,1986, p.70. 
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Ayatullah Khomeini was expelled in 1978. This measure 
was taken as a repressive act against the Shias of 
Iraq. Then in 1968 the two Shi a organizations-Al-DaWah 
Al-Islamiyah were founded by sayyid Muslim al-Hakim al-
Taba Tabai and al-Mujahidin founded in 1979. Al-Dawah 
had direct links with the Shah of Iran whose object was 
to over throw the Bathist government. Al-Dawah also had 
links with the group of Ayatullah Khomeini . 
The Shatt-Al-Arab Water-Way 
The Tigris and the Euphrates rivers formed a 
navigable rivers known as Shatt-al-Arab. It is 
extremely important for Iraq because the country's 
maritime trade and shipping depends a great deal on 
this river and constitutes its only link with the Sea. 
It extends from the city of Qurna at the Junction of 
the Tigris and Euphrates rivers, to the city of Al-Faw 
on the Gulf. Both the Shatt-al-Arab banks are within 
the Iranian territory. The total length of the Shatt-
al-Arab is about 204 kilometers. The lower parts of the 
river where the Iraq-Iran frontiers confront each other 
4. ibid, p.72. 
174 
31 
lO' 
I 
(J) 
X 
> 
I 
> 
> 
CD 
po 
CO 
H 
> 
H 
O 
-n 
o 
XI 
c 
M 
175 
is about 102 kilometers long. Except 14 kilometers, the 
whole course of the river, falls under the Iraqi 
territory. Of these 7 kilometers opposite the port of 
Khurramshahr were ceded by Iran under the 
constantinopole Protocol of 1913. the other 7 
kilometers, opposite the port of Abadan were ceded to 
Iran by the government of Iraq under the Frontier 
treaty of 1937 which made the boundary line along 
these 7 Kms., known as Thalweg (the middle line of the 
deepest water course) . Iran having a long sea coast, 
has so many Sea ports but Iraq has only one part i.e. 
Basra on the Shatt-al-Arab and it is her only access to 
the sea and the main outlet for her foreign trade and 
oil exports. 
Later on, until 1958, Iran did not asserted its 
claim in the Shatt-al-Arab and than Iran's attitude 
hardened after 1958 revolution led by Abdul Karim 
Kassem. Then both the countries pursued wholly 
divergent paths. Iran remained royalist member of CENTO 
and pursued a feudal capitalist economy. Iraq on the 
5. Encyclopedia. Britannica, Chicago; 1944 Vol.15, pp, 
228-30 
175 
other hand after establishing a socialist republic, 
posed psychological problem of adjustment and co-
existance with her neighbour and affected their overall 
relations adversely . 
The Shatt-al-Arab dispute between Iran and Iraq 
had been attended to dissolve by several treaties 
between the two countries in the past. But when Reza 
Shah came into power in Iran in 1921, Iran showed her 
unwillingness to accept the former agreements on the 
shatt-al-Arab. This led to armed clashes between Iran-
Iraq in Nov. 1932. On 4 July 1937 another border 
treaty was signed by the two countries. In Oct. 1957 
King Faisal of Iraq visited Iran in order to sign the 
new agreement. But the agreement would not be fulfilled 
due to the revolution in Iraq on 14 July 1958. The new 
regime, under general Abd-al-Karim Qasim caused the 
deterioration of Iran-Iraq relations on the question of 
control over the Shatt-al-Arab. There was a dispute 
between the Iraqi government and Reza Shah of Iran when 
the former anounced an expansion of its border, but 
6. ibid, p.368. 
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without military clashes. However, it was for the first 
time that the dispute showed the ideoloical antagonism 
of both countries. In security matters, Iran sought the 
collaboration of the conservative Arab Gulf states 
under the leadership of Tehran to act against Iraq. In 
1969 Iran denounced the Iran-Iraq treaty of 1937 and 
tried to dominate and control the shipping way in the 
Persian Gulf and captured the two most important ports, 
the Abadan and Khorramshahar from Iraq's control . 
In 1968 when the British announced their 
withdrawal from the Gulf, the differences among the 
Gulf Countries were increased. The Shah of Iran by 
virtue of his military and economic superiority in the 
entire region and assured of US support in any 
eventuality, assumed the position of the leader and 
7. EL-Azhari, M.S., Iran-Iraq War. D.K. Agencies, (P), 
Ltd, New Del hi,1984, p.18. 
On 4 July 1937 an Iranian-Iraqi border treaty was 
signed in Tehran which on the whole confirmed the 
Protocols of Constantinople of 1913/14. Accordingly 
the Iran-Iraq border continued to run along the 
east bank of the Shatt-al-Arab. Further more it was 
agreed to open the Shatt-al-Arab to merchantmen of 
all nations and Naval Vessels of the two 
contracting parties. (For detai1,see-EL-Azhary, 
M.S., Iran-Iraq War. D.K. Agencies, (P), Ltd, New 
Delhi, 1984, p.15. 
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the guide in the Middle east. This was naturally to the 
dislike of not only Iraq but all the Arab nations. 
Iraq protested against such gestures and condemned the 
conclusion of Iran-Kuwait agreement on the subject of 
continental shelf. Iraq insisted that it was the 
violation of her sovereignty over the territorial 
waters . 
Iraq protest on the Kuwait-Iran Treaty displeased 
the Iranians. The Shah took it as an affront to him 
personally. Their relations further deteriorated when 
Iraq concluded a Friendship Treaty with Moscow in 1972. 
The American gestures of support to the Kurd rebels of 
Iraq in 1972 further weakened the Iraqi position vis-a-
vis Iran, under such pressure, espacially the Iranian 
support to kurds which soon could have flared up 
internal strife, Iraq found it expedient to conceed to 
Iranian insistance to define I ran-Iraq border on the 
basis of the mid current of Shatt-al-Arab. A formal 
agreement was signed in June 1975 between President 
8. Sharma, R.C., (ed.), Perspectives on Iran-Iraq 
Conflict, Rajesh Publications, New Delhi, 1984, 
p.p. 47-51. 
179 
Saddam of Iraq and the Shah of Iran at Baghdad^. 
Saddam's signing of the agreement implied, sharing the 
soveriegn control over the disputed river borders. 
But if we say that the dispute between the two 
states concerning the border line or the control of the 
Shatt-al-Arab is the sole reason of the Iran-Iraq war. 
In fact, there are other factors which might be the 
causes. There are three conditions indicated by the 
following questions . 
1. "Was this war basically just a fresh out break 
of the age old rivalry between the states 
concerned for the control over the Shatt-al-
Arab? And are we to regard thier rival claims 
for the allegiance of Khuzistan/Arabistan as 
fundamental or was this just a side issue 
thrown for good measures? Alternatively and on 
a wider screen,was this war engaged with the 
fundamental aim on each side of achieving over 
all regional hegemony? or 
9. El-Azhari, M.S., op.cit., pp. 17-18. 
10. ibid, p.p. 126-127. 
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2. Is this was essentially just another of the 
wars of religion, a collision between a 
currently expansionary and fundamentalist 
Shi'ism and a secular Sunni dominated 
neighbour?or 
3. Should we see the clash in much more personal 
terms? Is this in any significant sense 
Saddam's war (or,if one prefers Khomeini's 
war), something that broke out only because one 
individual or two individuals so decided? 
In short, is this political war,a secretarian war 
or a private duel? 
When the Iraqi armed forces first invaded Iran on 
23 Sept. 1980, most outsiders were inclined to 
indentify as the real Iraqi motive, a determination to 
"topple Khomeini". And Khomeini for his part 
repeatedly declared, as the war proceeds, that he will 
not Sheath the Sword until Saddam Hussein has been put 
to it, that the removal of Saddam personally from the 
scene is the fundamental prerequisite for peace. 
However, each of the two protagonists has reasons 
enough for personal antipathy. 
ISl 
Should we then see it primarily as a religious 
war? In extreme terms, is Saddam Hussein justified in 
claiming that Iraq is fighting not just to defined 
itself but rather to protect the whole community of 
Sunni Arabs every-where? Most people, even the Sunni 
governments of the small Arab States in the immediate 
vicinity, regarded that claim, advanced in the firsts 
flush of the war, as an over statement. Certainly it is 
in Iraq itself that potential Shia disaffection is writ 
largest, and no one doubts that in the months leading 
to the outbreak of the war,the new Islamic Republic of 
Iran was fomenting disaffection amongst the Shia of 
Southern Iraq in protest at their traditional 
Subordination to a Sunni minority in Baghdad. In 
Baghdad's calculation the Iranian/Shia threat to the 
cohesion of Iraq alone, quite apart from possible 
consequences elsewhere in the Sunni World, was reason 
enough for hostility . However, on the one hand the 
hostility was harboured in the mind of the Iraqi 
leaders for a long time related to the question of the 
water way, the border and to recover of the three small 
11. ibid, p.128. 
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islands captured by the Shah in 1971, and also to the 
envious feeling both parties have towards each other. 
These hostile feelings concern territorial benefit and 
political power each side wanted to gain. Anyhow, it 
seems inadequate that the detaichment of Khuzistan from 
Iran's control was an important aim of the war. The 
Iraqi leader might personally hope that the war might 
as a by-product make the people of Khuzistan obliged to 
Iraq as their liberator. On the other hand the 
different ideologies and beliefes between the Sunni and 
the Shia rulers of the two countries have been existing 
throughout their history even in the Shah's days. 
Iraq with her 52 percent Shia population felt 
particularly frightened especially when the new Islamic 
Republic of Iran tried to instigate the Shias of the 
southern Iraq to feel dissatisfied with their 
subordinate position among the minority sunni 
population. This is clearly seen when Saddam Hussein 
declared that Iraq was fighting not just to defend 
herself but to defend all the Sunni Communities in the 
Arab World. The Iraqi President also blamed Iran of 
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1 2 
interfering in Iraq's internal affairs . Some 
authorities claim that Iraq had been supported by some 
Arab leaders like king Fahd of Saudi Arabia and king 
Hussain of Jordan, to attack Iran in order to "nip the 
approaching threat in the bud". The behaviour and 
practic.es of the Iranian government and the statements 
of the officials in Iran and their threatenings at the 
highest level give evidence that Iran was still 
pursuing the same attitude as of the Shah. Iran 
adopted the same racist-expansionist policy of the 
Shah. It is not a mere coincidence that Iraq was made 
the target of attack by the Iranian regime, not for 
reasons of complex circumstances but it was a pre 
designed act, engineered for a long time and in fact in 
terms of its aims and methods, was tailored to those 
1 3 
countries hostile to Arabism and Islam . 
There is also the possibility of another reason to 
be considered. Both Iraq's and Iran's leaders are 
ambitious of becoming the champion of the Middle-East 
12. External Information Department, Ministry of 
Culture & Information, Republic of Iraq, Selections 
from Iran-Iraq Dispute. 1983, p.7. 
13. ibid, p.7. 
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region. Iraq with the close relations of the super-
power, the USSR and Iran with her fervour of ideology 
and the hearty support of her people, both have the 
same aim. Two tigers can not live in the same place as 
a saying goes, the same is of Iran and Iraq. Due to the 
old rivalry, the war started in Sept, 1980. Iraq's 
leader harbours the idea to overthrow Khomeini, 
thinking that without him things in the area, including 
Iraq's freedom to do as she likes, will return to 
normally. Khomeini in turn, has repeatedly declared 
that the struggle would not stop until Saddam be 
14 
removed . So we can say at least that the relationship 
between the two countries after the comming into power 
of Saddam Husein and during the war is much degenerated 
due to the personal hatred between the two leaders. 
Until mid-1980 Saddam still hoped for the overthrow of 
Khomeini by a coup. When the coup was thwarted, he 
returned to another means, the direct attack on Iran. 
In December 1980 the border clashes increased to 
such an extent that there was daily fightings between 
14. Hiro, D., IRAN. Under the Avatullahs. R & K. Paul, 
Pub., London, 1987, p.174. 
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the forces of the two countries. During the first half 
of 1980 the undeclared war was intensified by both 
sides until it bursted into the real war on 22nd Sept. 
1980. Ralph King, While analysing the causes of the 
war, feels that "Compelling reasons for the war may be 
found in Iran's interference in Iraqi domestic 
15 
politics" . Parott, writing in a journal claims that 
Saddam Hussein visited Riyadh six weeks before the 
invasion, implying that he may have been encouraged by 
his Arab brothers to nib the emerging threat in the 
bud. He also goes on to say that king Hussein of Jordan 
1 R 
cabled his support to Saddam on attacking Iran 
In conclusion, Iraq's objections in starting the 
war appeared to be (1) to over throw Khomeini's regime 
and install a more liberal Iranian government instead, 
(2) to destroy the remaining effectiveness of the 
Iranian armed forces making Iran subservient to a 
militarily stronger Iraq, (3) to restablish Iraq's 
control over the whole of the Shatt-al-Arab, (4) to 
15. King, Ralph, Adolphi Papers 21, International 
Institute for Strategic Studies. London, 1987, p.5. 
16. Parott, J.B., Journal of South Asian and Middle 
Estern Studies.1985. Vol.X,No.2, Winter Issue,p.42. 
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liberate the Arabic-speaking Iranians living in 
Khuzistan, (5) to claim 200300 square kilometers near 
Qasre-Shirin, which the Shah had promised to Iraq, (6) 
to prevent religious fervour and fundamentalist Islamic 
theories from penetrating Iraq and, (7) to demonstrate 
to other Arab countries that Iraq is strong enough to 
dominate the Gulf . 
Negotiations: 
When the war started, the other Arab countries did 
not seem to take it seriously. Early in the war Iraqis 
complained that though they were fighting for all the 
Arabs, still they did not get enough Arab support. In 
fact there are at least two very strong reasons that 
the Arabs should support Iraq. The reasons are the 
r^ acial solidarity and religious unity. Despite these 
reasons, the Arabs of other states did not strongly 
support Iraq because the Iraqis made many mistakes on 
this issue, for instance Iraq did not consult with the 
other Arab governments before starting the war, Saddam 
17. 'Security in the Gulf; Regional and Global 
Aspects', Strategic Studies. Winter, 1987, Vol.XI, 
No.2, Islamabad. 
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presented the war as the Man's war-might be for his own 
reputation, the Iraqis themselves adopted a relaxed 
attitude towards the war from the beginning and the 
Iraqi regime could not present their cause to the Arabs 
and to the whole world concerning their legal right to 
the Shatt-al-Arab. By these errors, Iraq could not get 
proper backing from her Arab brothers and no Arab state 
move to stop the war or make any negotiation. 
Because of Iraq's superiority in the military 
capacity at first, the war was in her favour . The 
attack started by Iraq, pleaded by Iran was paid no 
attention by Iraq. Attempts of stopping the war were 
made in mid-1981 by the U.N. three missions led by Olaf 
Palme (Prime Minister of Sweden) on behalf of the U.N. 
Secretary General were performing the work between Nov. 
1980 and Feb. 1981. Palme was told by Saddam Hussein 
that the Iraqi troops would withdraw from Iran if Iran 
recognized Iraq's territorial rights. Both the 
4c 
Because the strain and stresses of anti Shah revolt 
and placement of Islamic Orientation of their struggles 
were considered by Iraq, to have weakened Iran's 
fighting and their military exhaustions were the most 
opportune movement for action. 
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disputants seemed to be irreconcilable . 
In the same February, the Islamic conference 
organization (ICO) set up a committee composed of nine 
persons to persuade that Iraq would withdraw her troops 
after two weeks and the two parties should submit their 
complaint to the Islamic Conference for arbitration. 
But this request was rejected by Bani Sadr, and the 
Prime Minister of the Islamic Republic of Iran who 
wanted nothing less than the agreement of 1975 and 
wanted that the Iraq should go out from Iran before any 
negotiation, and that, saddam Hussein must be publicly 
condemned as the aggressor. 
In May 1981 the same committee and a mission from 
the Non-Aligned Movement had tried to mediate. Saddam 
told them that, he was willing to bring the peace if 
they let the Shatt-al-Arab to be controlled by Iraq and 
the Gulf islands captured by the Shah, ten years ago, 
19 
be returned to Iraq . So the mediation was of no 
avai1. 
18. Sharma, R.C., Perspectives on Iran-Iraq Conflict. 
Rajesh Publications, New Delhi, 1984, p.p. 97-98. 
19. ibid, 10, p.132. 
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The three missions and few others however, were 
not discouraged. As the time passed by and the military 
performance was in the favour of Iran, Iraq seemed 
compelled to softened its attitude while Iran offered 
less stubborn conditions. In April 1982 both sides 
wanted a committee of enquiry to be appointed to 
investigate that who started the war, which was in the 
same line with a four point plan offered at the end of 
the month by the Islamic conference organization. The 
three points were the withdrawal of Iraqi troops, the 
stationing of the Islamic forces at the border and the 
appointment of an Islamic Commission to seek a 
settlement of the Shatt-al-Arab question. But the 
Iranian government wanted an unconditional withdrawal 
of the Iraqi troops together with the seperations and 
the restoration of the 1975 agreement and in addition, 
the repatriation to Iraq of 150000 Shi as who were 
expelled from Iraq. Iran was still adamant even when 
Saddam declared on 10th, June 1982 of his final 
decision to withdraw Iraqi troops from the Iran's 
territory. Khomeini still demanded for the Punishment 
of Saddam, the aggressor and increased one more demand 
I no 
that Iranian troops could pass through Iraq in order to 
20 
go to the war front in Lebanon . By the end of the 
year 1982 while Iraq showed clearly her willingness to 
compromise, Iran's attitude still did not change. So, 
the war continued, for Iraq had got sophisticated 
weapons from USSR. Thus Iraq's weakening will caused by 
her financial strain rather than military strain, 
because her oil exports were reduced to only 60000 
barrel per day. Iran issued a warning to the Gulf 
states that Iran would not avoid punishing to those 
countries who helped Iraq in attacking Iran, than the 
Gulf states stopped helping Iraq. Again, when OPEC 
decided to cut the oil price by $5 per barrel and to 
21 
reduce the oil production, Iraq suffered more 
Meanwhile Iraq had shown several clear signes of 
her willingness to compromise. Than the Iraqi delegates 
at the Non-Aligned Conference in New Delhi in March 
1983 suggested the appointment of a Non-Aligned 
arbitration tribunal whose decision would be accepted 
20. ibid, p.133. 
21. Asopa, S.K., op.cit., p.81. 
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by Iraq. Iran however, still stuck to the point of 
punishing the aggressor saddam Hussein which naturally 
Iraq could not accept. 
As far as the question of the Shatt-al-Arab is 
concerned, there was no other way besides the 
conclusion made long ago by Olaf Palme who was of the 
opinion that the two states have to run their river 
jointly. Since Iran did not demand more than the 
restoration of the 1975 Algier's Agreement for shared 
control, it seemed not to be a difficult task that a 
restatement under the fair considerations of the two 
parties could be accomplished together with Iraq's 
22 
repatriation of Shias expelled from Iraq . 
22. Sharma, R.C., op.cit., p. 136. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Gulf has remained one of the most prominent 
areas of the world since ancient times mainly because 
of its geo-political location. After the second 
world-war, its importance increased manifold due to 
the discovery of huge deposits of petroleum and also 
partly due to its strategic location in context of the 
cold war. However, it was mainly since October 1973 
that the region acquired an enviable position in 
international politics in terms of business prospects. 
It emerged as one of the leading commercial and indus-
trial centres on the face of the globe. 
Notwithstanding the fact that the Gulf region is 
predominantly inhabited by Arab people who prefess a 
common religion Islam, and speak Arabic language, it 
does not present a picture of homogenious United 
whole. The Gulf countries are divided on several 
counts: 
A. Among them some are economically affluent 
because they possess large stocks of oil both 
reserves producing in marketable quantity, 
while others are not so much well off such as; 
Bahrain and Oman etc., because they are not 
oil rich. 
B. Politically, their political system vary, some 
are monarchies, others are controlled repub-
lics. 
19^ 
C. Religiously, they are divided into Sunni and 
Shi its, 
D, Further, some are the pro-west and others are 
pro-Soviet states in the context of their 
foreign policy orientation. 
The Gulf States, having their unity in the OPEC 
and subsiquently in the OAPEC to guard their economic 
gains as oil producing states has hardly enabled them 
to get rid of their political dissensions which are 
caused by their intra regional rivalries, differing 
foreign policy perceptions, contradictory policy 
commitments and extra regional pressures. Both the 
OPEC and OAPEC, though they autwardly remain symbols 
of their unity, have been emasculated by radical 
differences among the members on account of their 
ideological perspectives and clash of material inter-
ests. However, the leading oil producing Gulf States 
could not restrain themselves from violating the 
restrictions and they earn extra petro-dollars by 
selling their oil in the open market. But the non-OPEC 
oil suppliers and the Gulf war which resulted in a 
decline in the demand for the Gulf oil. The conse-
quently oil glut has thrown the cartel in the dol-
drums. The OPEC was weak because of its heterogeneous 
composition. The foreign policy perspectives of its 
Gulf members are not often shared in general by the 
members from other regions who wish the cartel to 
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function purely as an economic organization but the 
I ran-Iraq war has crashed the OPEC unity. The Iran-
Iraq war which began as a conflict between the two 
neighbouring states having traditional rivalry based 
on ethnic-sectarian and border disputes has come in 
handy for Saudi Arabia and the United States which 
have developed a western interests in its continua-
tion. With the continuation of the war, Iraq has 
became more and more dependent on the Saudi largesse. 
And this dependence of Iraq on Saudi-Arabia was only 
because of the success of the Baa'th Socialist model 
on the Islamic Kingdom and its neighbours in the 
Gulf. Yet another beneficiary of the war is the United 
States which is deeply interested to put it in trouble 
of the Gulf. 
Due to this Iran-Iraq war, Israel has succeeded in 
utilizing this opportunity to distroy the PLO's strong 
hold in lebanon. Moreover, the /|rab disunity has also 
reduced the possibility of any immediate United Arab 
action against Israel to regain the lost territories 
and to realised the Palestinian people's inalienable 
right to independent statehood. The war has certainly 
don no good to Iran either. It is another matter that 
an armed confrontation with a traditional adversary 
had provided the opportunity to Khomeinei regime to 
stabilise itself through an upsurge of nationalism. No 
doubt the Gulf war has provided the United State an 
opportunity to induct a vast quantity of armaments 
lliG 
into region and to build its own military presence 
there. The Soviet Union however, was not interested in 
the continuation of the war. 
Moreover, the ongoing conflict between the two 
Islamic nations of the region has exploded the myth of 
Pan-Islamism. The Arab people into subjection. The 
ottoman Empire tried to retain its hold on the West 
Asian people in the name of a common religion. More-
over, the Pan-Islamism propagated by Saudi Arabia, 
and the aid given in the name of Islamic Solidarity, 
was used to expand the influence of the conservative 
forces allied with the United States to counter the 
impact of radical and Socialist ideas which had the 
potential to undermine the traditional Society and 
policy of the oil rich kingdom. 
However, the Iran-Iraq war has brought certain 
intresting dimensions. There were expectations on both 
sides that the ethnic and sectarian groupings across 
the border would rise against their respective gov-
ernments had been belide. Nationalism has emerged as a 
much more powerful force than it had been considered 
earlier. The Kurds and the Shias of Iraq have much to 
the charge in of the Khomeinei regime, stood firmly 
behind their Baathist government. Similarly, the 
Khuzistan Arabs did not rise against the Iraqi regime. 
Besides certain conflicts, in the region, the Gulf 
countries have promoted co-operation and co-ordination 
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among the member states of the Gulf Co-operation 
Council. These GCC Countries have determined to make 
effective use of their current oil-based-wealth so 
that future generation will also be able to enjoy high 
standard of living. The GCC region is the world's 
largest oil producer and has the world's largest 
proven crude reserves. It also has very large reserves 
of natural gas. Moving 'downstream' to integrate the 
various phases and sequences of production, refining, 
processing, shipping and marketing is an obvious and 
very promising way to encourage industrialization. 
Upgrading the domestic value the oil and gas base 
products would provide large financial aid to the 
region. The other petrochemicals are however, more 
promising, nevertheless but care must be exercised and 
the region is better advised to concentrate on such 
products for which highest price can be obtained. 
The choice of joint ventures should be complement-
ed, perhaps on a larger and broader scale. Last but 
not least in this area, it is to important to co-
ordinate trade policy with planned investments in the 
petrochemical industry it is difficult to see western 
markets closed to Arab Gulf petrochemical products 
while Gulf markets remain open to all sorts of western 
products. 
Regarding the superpowers invlovement in the Gulf 
I have examined the Soviet and American policies, as 
they have related to Iran in the Persion Gulf. When 
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the superpowers were active in the reign of Shah, 
handling the region, the Shah's assumption was that 
the U.S.S.R can be brought to play a constructive role 
and can be neutralized in the events of regional 
disputes (which are still existing). Soviet interest 
in oil and assistance to both Iran and Iraq and the 
traditional states of Arabian Peninsula remain con-
siderable constraints deterring Moscow from an adven-
turous course of action in the Gulf. 
Soviet naval capability does not appear as a 
threat to the region in the future, although, its 
political and psychological impact has doubtless been 
profound. However, Soviet policy in the Gulf and its 
relations with Iran are likely to evolve in the future 
in the light of opportunities presented both on the 
global and local levels. On the global level a great 
deal will depend on United States involvement and its 
reaction. But at present. United States is playing a 
dominant role in the region because of its oil inter-
ests and the need of her political presense. 
In security perceptions, the changing of the guard 
in the Gulf, from Britain to the U.S., took place 
during a long process stretching over several decades 
when the US interests in the Gulf became considerable, 
after Britain withdrew in 1971. However, the American 
policy in the Gulf since 1971 falls into the distinc-
tive, almost schismatic, periods; 1971-79 and 1979 to 
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the present. While the first was characterised by 
benign inaction,the second has tended towards over 
reaction. American policy towards the Gulf during the 
first period was predicated by the Nixon Doctrine, 
which provided the foundation of the so called " twin 
pillar" policy by which the US relied upon Iran and 
Saudi Arabia, as its surrogates in the Gulf. 
But a series of troubling events in the region 
around 1979, particularly Soviet inroads in several 
countries and the fall of the Pahlavi regime in Iran, 
forced a re-evaluation of this policy. The Carter 
Doctrine threatened the Soviet Union with retaliation, 
and eventually the US 'Central Command' was created to 
provide the military intervene in the Gulf if deemed 
necessary. But this policy has been shifted by the 
action of the subsequent Reagan administration. 
Despite the continuing soft world oil market and 
declining international oil prices, the Gulf remains a 
key area of US strategic interest. 
As, for possibility of cordial relations between 
Gulf States is concerned, it can be said by way of 
conclusion that, their differences are too complicated 
to be solved easily. It is basically inter-Arab 
rivalry which will create all sort of difficulties in 
the way of their unity. Besides this, the interest of 
foreign countries specially the two super powers will 
further raise obstacle and prevent the Arabs from 
getting United. 
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The Arab politics to a large extent has been 
personality based . It is personel differences of Arab 
rulers, which dictate their respective policies. 
Moreover, national interets of some countries persuade 
their rulers to adopt contradictory stands and thus 
contribute to the disunity of the Arabs, for instance 
in the recent past, it were Egypt and Saudi Arabia 
which fought among themselves for supremacy among the 
Arabs mainly because of the two reasons. First, it was 
a clash between two divergent system of governance, 
second, the personel differences of two Arab rulers, 
Jamal Abdul Nasser and King Faisal who represented two 
different approach to out standing West Asian problems 
where at work. This was a major factor behind the 
inter-Arab differences and rivalry, for the two lead-
ers tried hot to win alliences or Cajole other Arab 
heads of states into agreeing with their standpoint. 
The super power rivalry also contributed to 
inter-Arab rivalry. It were mainly the ideological, 
economic and strategic interest of the powers which 
prompted them to capitalize on inter Arab differences. 
The Arab disunity was thus in the interest of great 
powers, and it is because of this that have always 
tried to cultivated their disunity. In order to serve 
their respective national interest, the great powers 
have established alliences or found stoogies in the 
Arab World. Unless the involvement of the great powers 
8 
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in West Asia comes to an end and unless the Arab heads 
of state try to see beyond their own noses and start 
thinking about larger interest of the Arab Nation. 
There is no possibility of Arab Unity or of their 
coming together. 
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